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This thesis investigates the effect of the Voluntary Separation Incentive/ 
Special Separation Bonus (VSI/SSB) on the voluntary separation behavior of Navy 
officers and Navy enlisted personnel using the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) 
model. The thesis also estimates the effect of the threat of a reduction-in-force 
(RIF) on VSI/SSB program acceptance behavior. Data provided by the Defense 
Data Manpower Center (DMDC) on VSIISSB eligible Navy officers and Navy and 
Air Force enlisted personnel in FY93 and FY92 are used for the empirical analyses. 
Multivariate probit models are estimated to predict the voluntary separation rate in 
the absence of the financial incentive. These estimates are used to calculate the 
costs and benefits of the VSI/SSB program for both Navy officers and Navy enlisted 
personnel. This thesis finds that the VSI/SSB program increased the voluntary 
separation rate by 44.93 percent for Navy officers, but only by 4.29 percent for 
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With the global political changes in the late 1980's leading to a reduction 
in perceived external security threats and the federal government increasingly 
placing emphasis on reducing the federal deficit, the U.S. military services 
experienced substantial cuts in their budget authorities for the first time since the 
advent of the All-Volunteer-Force (AVF). Simultaneously, the cessation of the 
communist threat brought an end to the military's reliance on containment 
policies, thus diminishing the need for a large standing army (Warner and 
Pleeter, 1995). Thus, in the late 1980's/early 1990's, finding it increasingly 
difficult to justify its military strength and facing decreasing funding, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) was forced to reduce its size. For any 
organization in this particular situation the biggest and fastest savings are 
achieved through personnel reductions. Between 1989 and 1995 cutbacks were 
planned to encompass approximately 500,000 servicemen and women 
throughout DoD. Reducing active duty personnel by this amount would save the 
Defense Department-$103.2 billion over the next five years, as compared to, for 
example, savings of only $2.1 billion during the same time period if the Navy 
chose to decommission its four Iowa-class battleships. (Kirby, 1993) 
Because of its unique internal labor market, attempts to reduce its 
numbers and simultaneously maintain an effective, motivated and well-trained 
·force, pose particular challenges for DoD. Reducing the number of accessions 
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is one possibility to cut down personnel, but trying to accomplish a drawdown of 
this size solely by decreasing the level of recruitment would inevitably lead to 
severe shortages in higher paygrades and in certain military occupational 
specialties (MOS) later. Due to its internal labor market, DoD is forced to enlist 
a certain amount of young men and women each year to ensure that a sufficient 
pool of junior personnel is available to become the senior personnel of the 
future. The flow of accessions needed is based on force size and structure. 
However, a lower force size allowed a proportionate reduction in the flow of new 
recruits. Thus the Navy lowered its accessions between FY 1990 and FY 1994 
by 29 percent. (Giarrizzo, 1993) 
Solving the problem of manpower reductions entirely by introducing 
mandatory early retirement policies also would have distorted the shape of the 
force, only that then the military services would have faced a shortage in senior, 
experienced personnel that probably would have negatively affected military 
effectiveness. 
Another alternative policy to reduce personnel would be involuntary 
separations or reductions-in-force (RIF), but the potential costs associated with 
such a policy would be immense. Historically, military personnel have come to 
believe that once they gain six or eight years of service (YOS), DoD virtually 
guarantees them to serve to at least 20 years and thus become vested for 
retirement benefits if they meet certain performance standards. Using RIF would 
have broken this "implicit contract" between DoD and career personnel and thus 
2 
would have severely damaged morale and motivation of the remaining 
personnel. Potentially being interpreted as "opportunistic" behavior on the part 
of DoD, a RIF may have caused a loss of reputation as an employer which 
additionally may have created future retention and recruitment problems. (Mehay 
and Hogan, 1995) Additionally, the impact of a major RIF by the largest 
employer in the U.S. on politics and society was of substantial concern to policy-
makers and therefore, it was congressionally-directed that involuntary 
separations of career members should be avoided altogether if possible. 
Thus, accomplishing the largest personnel drawdown in the history of the 
AVF but at the same time maintaining a balanced force structure required the 
Department of Defense to introduce new policies to induce non-vested mid-
career personnel to leave voluntarily. To reshape the force so that personnel 
inventories and quality levels match the requirements of the new smaller force 
structure, Congress authorized the Voluntary Separation Incentive/Special 
Separation Bonus (VSIISSB) program in the National Defense Authorization Act 
for FY92. This program was intended to target specific paygrade grades, ratings 
and YOS cells to ensure that the drawdown would be accomplished without 
personnel and skill shortages in each cell. 1 The program offered two different 
financial separation incentives that are briefly described below. 
1 For a detailed description of the VSI/SSB program refer to: Kirby, Mary A., "A MULTIVARIATE 
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE VSI/SSB SEPARATION PROGRAM ON NAVY 




B. THE VOLUNTARY SEPARATION INCENTIVE (VSI) AND SPECIAL 
SEPARATION BONUS (SSB) PROGRAMS 
The Secretary of Defense might offer service members the opportunity to 
apply for an early separation bonus provided they meet following eligibility 
criteria: 
1. He/she must have served on active duty for a minimum of six years 
before December, 5 1991 and must have completed his/her initial term of 
enlistment or initial period of obligated service; 
2. He/she must have served at least five years of continuous active 
duty prior to the date of separation; 
3. Upon separation he/she must have served less than 20 years of 
active duty service and must not be eligible for retired or retainer pay; 
4. He/she must meet certain other criteria as the secretary of their 
respective service may prescribe, i.e., additional requirements regarding 
years of service, paygrade, skill or rating, and remaining period of 
obligated service. (Kirby, 1993) 
If eligible, service members may apply to leave active duty and, once 
approved for separation by the Secretary of Defense, may choose to be 
compensated by either the VSI or the SSB program. Those who choose to 
separate and take the VSI receive an annual payment starting at the date of their 
departure from active duty, where the total number of annual payments equals 
- -
twice the number of years of active duty. The annual payment is computed by 
the following formula: 
Annual VSI payment = 2.5% *final month's basic pay * 12 * YOS 
4 
Those who choose to leave and take advantage of the I ump sum payment 
receive a one time financial payment calculated as follows: 
SSB amount= 15% *final month's basic pay* 12 * YOS 
DoD introduced these policies January 1, 1992 in the hope they would 
allow accessions to remain at sustaining levels and that targeting the right 
number of persons at the right time would ensure sufficient promotion 
opportunities for the new, smaller career force. (Mehay and Hogan, 1995) 
Although created by DoD for all four services, the implementation of the program 
varied by service. The Navy explicitly renounced the possibility of reductions-in-
force in the event the acceptance of the voluntary separation program lagged 
behind expectations. Air Force members, however, from the beginning of the 
drawdown faced the threat of involuntary separation. Although VSI/SSB was 
implemented, the USAF conditioned Rl F on whether the acceptance of the 
program met their reduced end strength goals. As a measure of vulnerability to 
a RIF the Air Force introduced a five-tier system with tier 1 being exempt from 
being separated involuntarily and tier 5 having the highest threat of a RIF. 
(Sewell, 1994) Tables 1.1 and 1:2 show the number of people who accepted 
VSIISSB for all four services during fiscal years 1992 through 1995 for officers 
and enlisted personnel, respectively. 
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Table 1.1 VSIISSB Acceptance Figures for Officers 
FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 
Navy VSI 0 258 392 28 
SSB 0 432 633 40 
Army VSI 2064 1180 608 0 
SSB 2696 1267 754 1 
USAF VSI 1109 1598 95 0 
SSB 1233 1123 47 0 
Marine Corps VSI 10 149 133 0 
SSB 1 119 66 0 
Department of Defense VSI 3165 3185 1228 28 
SSB 3930 2941 1500 41 
total 4295 6126 2728 69 
Source: derived from data obtained from Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 
Table 1.2 VSIISSB Acceptance Figures for Enlisted Personnel 
FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 
Navy VSI 622 292 567 20 
SSB 3501 3103 2671 110 
Army VSI 1685 122 217 0 
SSB 23469 3415 5265 25 
USAF VSI 1150 1181 138 0 
SSB 13673 7494 530 0 
Marine Corps VSI 146 311 174 0 
SSB 730 1037 380 0 
Department of Defense VSI 3603 1906 1096 20 
SSB 41373 15049 8846 135 
total 44976 16955 9942 155 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
It is interesting to note that for enlisted personnel the take rate of the SSB 
option exceeds by far that of the VSI throughout all four services. The figures for 
the officers, however, reveal that with the exception of the Navy, the VSI and the 
SSB acceptance figures are more equally split and that officers in the Marine 
Corps by far preferred the VSI over the SSB option of the program. 
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C. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
A substantial amount of research has already focused on identifying the 
factors that affect the voluntary separation decision and those that influence the 
choice between the two programs. It has been consistently found that individual 
characteristics significantly affect both decisions. However, so far few studies 
have attempted to estimate the underlying true voluntary separation rate, i.e., 
who was really induced by the financial incentives to leave active military duty? 
As with most financial incentive policies, a major disadvantage of VSI/SSB is 
providing payments to those who would have left anyway even without the 
incentive program. To minimize this economic rent, policy makers must be able 
to estimate the separation rate without financial inducements; that is, how many 
of those personnel who were at a reenlistment point would have left without the 
financial incentive? Furthermore, how many who were still obligated would have 
left without the incentive if they had simply been released from their contract? 
Additionally, with increasingly scarce resources available for the military even a 
politically acceptable program such as the VSI/SSB must constantly be 
reevaluated to determine whether benefits outweigh costs and whether it is an 
efficient program. 
This thesis statistically estimates the true separation rates of naval 
officers during FY93 and of Navy enlisted personnel during FY92 using the 
Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) framework. These were the first years of 
the program for each group. Applying the same model, it then compares Navy 
7 
with Air Force enlisted personnel to determine whether the threat of involuntary 
reductions-in-force significantly influenced the separation decision during FY92. 
The hope is that the information developed here can help military policy makers 
to design efficient programs to accomplish future reductions in personnel. 
Knowing the costs and the true benefits of VSIISSB, the mix of various programs 
implemented to decrease the size of the military forces (from reducing 
accessions to early retirement) can be optimized to implement the most effective 
drawdown. 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter II 
presents the analytic framework of the ACOL model and reviews relevant 
literature. Since previous research dealt with literature relevant to the theory of 
personnel reduction, Chapter II focuses on whether the ACOL model is suitable 
to analyze separation behavior, explains the underlying theoretical approach 
and reviews the relevant ACOL literature. Chapter Ill explains the applied 
methodology and describes the data used in this thesis. The computations for 
the various variables are introduced and important assumptions are discussed. 
Chapter IV presents the results of the models and estimates the true effect of the 
VSI/SSB program as well as the effect of the threat of a RIF on the separation 
decision. Chapter V summarizes the results of the research. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary concern of this thesis is to statistically estimate the 
underlying true separation rate of VSIISSB eligible personnel. Other issues 
include: 
1. Can the ACOL framework, which initially was developed to analyze 
the military reenlistment decision, be applied to the separation decision of 
VSI/SSB eligible personnel? 
2. What are the immediate financial costs of the VSI/SSB program 
and what are its benefits? 
3. Is the threat of involuntary separation an effective complement to 
the VSI/SSB program, i.e., did it significantly increase the acceptance rate 
of comparable personnel? 
9 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING FRAMEWORK 
With the advent of the All-Volunteer-Force (AVF) in 1973 and the 
associated change of personnel supply, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
placed increasing emphasis on analyzing and understanding the reenlistment 
behavior of enlisted personnel. It is in this context that the Annualized Cost of 
Leaving model (ACOL) was originally developed. Warner and Goldberg (1984) 
used the ACOL model to explain the effect of monetary and non-pecuniary 
factors on enlisted retention. To make the retention decision, the individual is 
assumed to compare the utility from leaving immediately with the utility of 
remaining over each possible future period n of military service, where 
n=1 ,2, ..... ,s and s denotes the maximum allowable future periods of service. 
They assumed that depending upon rank, all personnel are mandatorily retired 
at various points between 20 and 30 years of service. The utility associated with 
each outcome (staying vs. leaving) is the sum of two components: the present 
value of the income stream of the outcome and the present value of the 
monetary equivalent-of the non-pecuniary aspects of the outcome. The latter 
component is unobserved. Their model used the following definitions: 
Mj = the individual's expected military pay in each future year of service, 
j= 1, ... ,s 
Rjn = yearly retired pay the individual will receive after n more years of 
service, j = n+1 , ... , T, where T equals life expectancy. 
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- ----------, 
WjO = the future civilian earnings stream the individual expects to receive 
if he leaves immediately, j = 1 , ... , T 
~n = the future civilian earnings stream the individual expects to receive 
if he leaves after n more periods, j = n+1 , ... , T 
p = the individual's yearly discount rate 
They denoted Ym and Yc as the annual monetary equivalents of the non-
pecuniary aspects of military and civilian life, respectively. Warner and 
Goldberg assumed these values to be fixed over time for a given individual, but 
to be jointty normally distributed with means (J..Lm, J..Lc) and variances (cfm, cfc) 
across individuals. 
The individual's retention decision is assumed to be based on utility 
maximization. The utility of remaining in the military exceeds the utility from 
leaving immediately only if the present value of military pay plus the taste factor 
for military life over the n year reenlistment period, plus the present value of 
retirement pay and post-military civilian pay and the taste factor for civilian life 
over the remaining years of life, is greater than the present value of the sum of 
civilian pay and the taste factor for civilian life if the individual leaves 
immediately. This condition can be written as: 
~Mi+rm ~---=~-. + 
j=l (1+ PY 
f. ~·o +rc 
> ~ . 
j=l (I+pY (1) 
12 
.-----------------------------------
Or, alternatively, this condition for staying in the military can also be written as: 
~ M 1 ~ R1n + W
11
_·n 
en=£.... j + £.... 
j=l (1 + p) j=n+l (1 + p) - :± ~0 j j=l (1 + p) 
or in abbreviated form: 
n 1 
en> o:L ' j 
J=l (1 + p) 
(2) 
(3) 
where Cn is the cost of leaving and o is the net preference for civilian life over 
1 
military life (rc-rm). Finally, dividing both sides by L . they express the (1+pY 
condition for remaining in the military as: 
A = en >8 
n n 1 
:L j 
j=l (1 + p) 
(4) 
with An as the Annualized Cost of Leaving over the horizon of n years of 
reenlistment. 
According to this model the individual prefers a strategy of staying n more 
years in the military to one of leaving immediately only if the annualized cost of 
13 
leaving exceeds the net taste for civilian life, where it is assumed that o> 0. The 
individual will leave only if the strategy of leaving immediately is preferred to any 
strategy that involves staying, or An< ofor all n = 1 , ... ,s. This is equivalent to the 
condition max An < o so that the relevant ACOL value for the retention decision 
is the maximum over the set (At, ... ,As) and the relevant time horizon for the 
retention decision is the one over which the ACOL value is maximized. 
Assuming that the net tastes for civilian life are distributed normally N(J.l, o-2) with 
mean J.l and variance o-2 the previously mentioned decision rule to stay can be 
written as: 
ACOL;-.u 
1i = P( ACOL; > oi) = f-ro a N( O,l)dz (5) 
or as: 
( ) fp, +P *ACO'~+A. •x 1i = P ACOL; > 8; = _:, 1 ._, -~ <!.} N(O,l)dz (6) 
where ri represents _the probability of staying for individual i, ACOL/' is the 
maximum ACOL value for individual i, and & and ~ are the respective vectors of 
parameters and individual characteristics. 
Warner and Goldberg calculated the expected military pay plus retirement 
pay stream by using a recursive dynamic programming algorithm with imbedded 
promotion probabilities dimensioned by paygrade and length of service (LOS) for 
14 
which the authors employed average Navy promotion rates. Estimates for the 
civilian earnings stream were derived by estimating an earnings function with 
linear and quadratic terms for years of post-military experience and various 
demographic variables. Their calculations of An over different time horizons 
revealed that for most service members at their first-term reenlistment point the 
maximum An is found over the horizon of a 4-year reenlistment. Only when 
personal discount rates were 10 percent or lower and no reenlistment bonus 
was paid was the optimal horizon as long as 20 years of service. 
Using this framework, Warner and Goldberg concluded that ACOL 
explains much of the variation in the probability of reenlisting. They estimated 
probit models for several Navy enlisted occupational groups and found that 
ACOL and being married both affected the retention decision positively and 
were statistically significant. The estimated probit coefficient of ACOL was in 
the range 0.000121 to 0.000325. Because their ACOL variable already took in 
account pay differences attributed to marital status, the rise in reenlistment rates 
due to marital status is speculated to reflect the greater value of non-pecuniary 
benefits, such as health care for dependents, available to married personnel. 
Subsequent research on the decision to stay in the military reemphasizes 
the importance of the economic factors modeled in ACOL. Smith et al (1991) 
estimated econometric models of first- and second-term reenlistment decisions 
of Army enlisted personnel. To control for self-selection as members progress 
through the personnel system, they used a slightly different version of the 
15 
original ACOL model, the ACOL2 model. Using age-earnings profiles to 
estimate the civilian pay stream until age 65 and promotion time models to 
derive the future military pay stream, the authors calculated that for almost all 
the enlisted soldiers in their sample the maximum ACOL at both the first- and 
second-term decision points involves a military career that lasts through 20 
years of service. The maximum value of ACOL was found to be prior to 
becoming eligible for retirement because, due to the vesting of the military 
pension after completing 20 YOS, ACOL values for military careers longer than 
20 years are less than at the 20-year point. 
Further developing the Warner and Goldberg (1984) model specification, 
Smith et al concluded that the ACOL variable, being a member of a minority 
group and being female all increase the probability of reenlisting. On the other 
hand, the AFQT score (as a measure of the individual's ability) lowers it 
significantly in 2 out of 6 regressions and increases it (but insignificantly) in the 
remaining 4. Consistent with Warner and Goldberg's findings, they found that 
the number of dependents (as a proxy for the individual's preference for the non-
pecuniary benefits of military life) affected retention behavior positively. The 
weak and inconsistent effect of the AFQT scores on the stay/leave decision is 
not unexpected because some studies have found that higher quality personnel 
are associated with higher reenlistment probabilities (Daula and Baldwin, 1986), 
while other studies have found a negative relationship between AFQT and 
reenlistment rates (Black et al, 1987). 
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In a similar analysis of first- and second-term reenlistment decisions, 
Daula and Moffitt ( 1995) compared the ACOL model to dynamic programming 
models and found that all give approximately the same fit. Their results basically 
duplicate those of Smith et al (1991) with regard to race, AFQT and dependents. 
Additionally, it was found that enlistees who enlisted to obtain educational 
benefits were less likely to reenlist. Those who were induced to enlist by those 
programs are hypothesized to take advantage of them as early as possible and, 
thus, have an incentive to leave at their first reenlistment point. 
In one of the few studies that dealt with the retention behavior of officers, 
Mairs et al (1992) estimated a two-decision ACOL2 retention model of Air 
Defense Artillery (ADA) officer personnel. Specifying 2 three-year decision 
windows, they used a panel probit regression procedure and found statistical 
evidence that the ACOL significantly affects retention positively. They found the 
ACOL coefficient to be 0.000021. Using dummy variables for marital status, 
gender and race in their regression equation to control for differences in the 
civilian income stream and for differences in the preferences for military life, the 
authors concluded that married and female personnel are more likely to stay, 
while ethnic minorities are less likely to stay. This duplicates Smith et al's 
(1991) findings on sex and marital status but contradicts those on race. 
However, it is important to realize that this study analyzed the first- and second-
term reenlistment behavior of enlisted personnel whereas Mairs et al (1992) 
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studied the retention decision of officers upon completion of their initial obligated 
service, i.e., personnel not forced to fulfill an enlistment contract. 
In a study on the separation behavior of not-contract bound workers, 
Black et al (1990) focused on the dynamics of job separation of Federal civilian 
employees of the DoD. Instead of computing the Annualized Cost of Leaving the 
authors calculated the "Annualized Cost of Staying" and concluded that 
increases in Federal compensation significantly improve retention of employees, 
that females are more likely to quit than males and that blacks are less likely to 
voluntarily leave their jobs than whites. 
Although most of the previously mentioned research focused on the 
reenlistment behavior of relatively junior personnel, Goldberg (1982) analyzed 
the effect of military pay on the retention rates of third-term enlisted personnel in 
the U.S. Nav}t. Using data on all third-termers (length of service 11-14) who 
were eligible to make reenlistment decisions, Goldberg assumed the individual 
either reenlisted and stayed until YOS 20 or left the Navy immediately. 
Historically, reenlistment rates approach unity with increasing length of service, 
because mid-careerists who stay in for 11 to 14 years have strong preferences 
for military life. This self-selection, combined with a rising attractiveness of the 
military retirement system with increasing YOS, is hypothesized to be a major 
factor in influencing reenlistment behavior. Thus, Goldberg chose a relevant 
horizon from the date of the reenlistment decision to the date at which the 
individual could retire from the Navy to calculate the military pay stream. 
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Assuming that those who stay for 20 will earn the same as those veterans who 
left earlier, Goldberg used the same time horizon for computing the returns of 
leaving the Navy at the decision point. Specifying logit regression models for 9 
different occupational groups with ACOL being the only explanatory variable, 
Goldberg found that all coefficients were significant and varied from 0.000179 to 
0.000280. 
The variety of problems analyzed using the ACOL approach illustrates the 
broad range of possible applications for this framework. Statistical evidence 
emphasizes the influence of the annualized cost of leaving on reenlistment, 
retention and voluntary separation behavior while the effects of demographics 
such as gender and race are inconsistent. Currently, the ACOL model is one of 
the most popular estimation techniques for analyzing personnel dynamics in 
DoD, but a major issue still to be discussed is whether it is an appropriate 
means to model the separation behavior of VSIISSB eligible personnel. 
Sherman (1993) specifically analyzed this particular issue by examining 
soldiers' responses to a survey on a proposed VSIISSB program and, using the 
framework of occupational decision making, he identified factors affecting 
soldiers' decisions about separating. According to his study, 
The reenlistment decision is essentially a comparison of 
current and future earnings and satisfaction in the military in 
comparison to the same outcomes if one were to leave the military. 
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It seems reasonable that the decision making process and 
factors that underlie the decision to accept or reject an early 
separation incentive are very similar to those that affect the 
reenlistment decision and that the "Reenlistment Models" can be 
directly applied to the analysis of the early separation incentive 
decision. 
Making use of data from the Survey of Total Army Military Personnel 
(STAMP), which was mailed to 51,000 active and reserve soldiers shortly after 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Sherman assessed soldiers' responses to 
separation incentives and their reactions to variables commonly used in the 
ACOL model. Note that only soldiers with between 6 and 19 years of service 
answered the items on the early separation incentive offers. This YOS cell 
roughly corresponds to the actual VSI/SSB eligibility range. To evaluate 
alternative Army reenlistment models the author examined the correlation 
between ACOL variables and separation incentives and came to the following 
conclusions: 
1. Army reenlistment models provide a sound explanatory basis for 
understanding early separation incentive decision making, 
2. Years of service and rank have been shown to be significantly 
related to early separation behavior, 
3. Race and gender do not statistically significantly affect the early 
separation incentive decision. 
Sherman's findings support the hypothesis that the ACOL framework is a 
viable method to analyze separation behavior in conjunction with the offering of 
financial separation incentives. 
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B. THE PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATE 
An important factor in the ACOL framework is the personal discount rate 
(PDR). It is critical in the calculation of the present values of both the returns of 
staying in and leaving the military and in annualizing the difference of the two 
pay streams. The higher the individual's PDR, the greater he/she discounts 
earnings received further in the future, for example retirement benefits. Since 
military retirement is regarded as a significant factor in bringing the lifetime 
earnings of military personnel up to parity with their civilian counterparts, cuts in 
pension benefits could severely reduce the attractiveness of the military as a 
career. Thus, to better estimate the effects of changes in the retirement system 
on personnel dynamics, a multitude of studies have addressed the question of 
the personal discount rate of officers as well as enlisted personnel. However, 
past research on the PDR is instructive but far from conclusive. 
Nord and Schmitz (1985) in their study to assess the PDR reviewed a 
wide variety of previous research and tried to combine the results to come up 
with more consistent estimates before conducting their own analysis. Table 2.1 
presents an overview of their findings on the personal discount rate. As shown in 
Table 2.1, estimates of the personal discount rate vary in the relatively wide 
range from 1.2 to 39 percent, but generally decline with age. 
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Table 2.1 Results of Selected Studies on the Personal Discount Rate (PDR) 
Study Sample Group PDR (%) 
Friedman (1957) U.S. farm familiesa 30 
Landsberger ( 1971 ) Israeli consumersa 9-27 
Heckman (1976) U.S. consumersa 18-20 
Rosen (1976) U.S. male high school and college 7.2-8.7 
graduatesa 
Hausman (1979) 46 U.S. households and its personsa 10-39 
Leffler and Lindsay (1981) Applicants to medical schoola 10 
Gilman (1976) Civilian employees 1.2-24 
Cylke et al (1982) Navy enlisted personnela 16-20 
Black (1983) Enlisted personnel of all servicesa 12.5 
a information about the sample group were obtained from the respective study. See reference 
section for source description. 
Source: Nord and Schmitz (1985) 
To derive their own results, Nord and Schmitz chose to conduct a direct 
assessment study, i.e., a method that uses survey data to arrive at PDR 
estimates. Using the existing 1983 Army Research Institute (ARI) Exit Survey 
and attaching a set of questions to it, the survey was administered to 6,498 
soldiers in grades E-3 to E-9 undergoing processing prior to a permanent 
change of station or exit from the Army. Their findings suggest the PDR for the 
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average soldier in their sample to be 14.2 percent, which reemphasizes those 
studies that found it to be in the range of 1 0 to 20 percent. 
Analyzing the decision of military personnel to choose between the lump-
sum payment or the annual installment version of the VSI/SSB program Warner 
and Pleeter (1995) estimated personal discount rates of officers and enlisted 
personnel in FY92 and FY93. Reviewing previous research on PDRs, the 
authors drew three general conclusions: 
1. Individuals do not discount all future values at the same rate; the 
PDR appears to decline for choices involving larger sums. 
2. The personal discount rate varies with the time delay of the reward 
or penalty. Individuals appear to discount future amounts hyperbolically, 
applying higher discount rates to amounts with a short delay. 
3. There is some evidence that the PDR varies with personal 
characteristics. It has been found to decline with education, age, and 
income while being a member of a minority seems to increase the 
discount rate. However, results with respect to gender and marital status 
were mixed. · 
For each individual in their sample Warner and Pleeter calculated the break-
even discount rate o·, i.e., the rate that equates the value of the SSB lump-sum 
with the present value of the VSI annuity. Individuals are expected to choose 
the SSB over the VSI if their personal discount rate D exceeds D • and to select 
the VSI if otherwise. 
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To model the VSIISSB choice formally, they expressed D as a linear 
function of the vector of observed characteristics (X) of individual i and random 
error (e): 
D=P*X+e (7) 
Assuming that E""'N(O, ~) and that individuals select the lump-sum SSB payment 
if D > o· , the personal discount rate was estimated by using probit regression 
equations. It was found to be 18.5 percent for the average officer and to be at 
least 23 percent for the average enlisted person. However, according to Warner 
and Pleeter the enlisted predictions in excess of 23 percent are implausibly high. 
C. THE TRUE EFFECT OF THE VSIISSB PROGRAM 
At least one study tried to d~termine the true effect of the VSIISSB 
program on separation behavior. Mehay and Hogan (1995) analyzed the factors 
affecting the voluntary separation behavior of Navy enlisted personnel in FY92. 
Specifying logit regression models of the decision to either accept the VSIISSB 
program and leave the military forces or to reject it and stay in, Mehay and 
Hogan found that those with higher paygrade grade and more military 
- -
experience (higher YOS) were less likely to accept the bonus. These results 
suggest that, on balance, these factors increase military pay (by increasing the 
probability of and size of the pension benefit) more than they increase the 
civilian option (by raising the dollar value of the separation bonus). Their 
expectation that women and minorities face a higher cost of leaving due to 
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discrimination and other institutional factors that might restrict their civilian 
employment opportunities and potential earnings, was met for minorities, but not 
for women. They find that minorities are, on average, about five percent less 
likely to voluntarily separate which is hypothesized to result from the military's 
favorable climate for equal opportunity and the generally higher unemployment 
of minorities in the civilian economy. Contradicting existing evidence that 
women historically have higher reenlistment rates, Mehay and Hogan found that 
females are more likely to accept the bonus, the reasons of which are unclear. 
Also of interest are their findings on the effect of ability on the voluntary 
separation decision. One concern of policy-makers was the possibility that more 
able personnel would be more likely to leave under the bonus program. 
Introducing variables for AFQT and education in the models, Mehay and Hogan 
found mixed evidence on whether the more able are more inclined to leave 
voluntarily. ·While their AFQT coefficient suggests that more able personnel face 
better civilian employment and earnings opportunities and, thus, are more likely 
to leave, the years of education had a negative effect on accepting the bonus. 
The effects of family status point also in opposite directions: married personnel 
were found to be less likely to leave; which may be explained by the fact that 
military allowances and in-kind benefits are greater for those with dependents. 
However, those with larger families are more likely to leave which may be 
explained by the fact that frequent separation associated with active duty is 
more disruptive to families with children than to married couples without 
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children. Noteworthy are their findings that the spouse in a dual-military couple 
has a higher probability to leave than those married to spouses who do not work 
or who have civilian jobs. This effect is hypothesized to be due to the difficulties 
of maintaining a normal lifestyle when both spouses are on active duty. 
Another interesting part of their study is their estimation of the effect of the 
VSI/SSB program on voluntary separation behavior. To derive an estimate of 
those enlisted personnel who would not have left in the absence of the financial 
incentive program, Mehay and Hogan compared the program separation rates 
with those during a pre~drawdown year. According to the study, 2/3 of those 
who left were induced to do so by the financial incentive aspect of the program, 
i.e., the VSI/SSB program increased the acceptance rate by 200 percent. 
Additionally, Mehay and Hogan compared Navy and USAF VSIISSB 
separation rates to estimate the effect of the threat of involuntary separation on 
bonus acceptance behavior. While the threat of reductions-in-force (RIF) was 
nonexistent in the Navy, the USAF introduced a five-tier system in which the 
threat of RIF was conditioned on having military occupations that were 
designated as facing some threat of layoff. While tier 1 was exempt from a 
potential layoff, the threat of involuntary separation increased with tier 5 having 
the highest threat of layoff. Incorporating dummy variables for these tiers in their 
model, Mehay and Hogan found statistical evidence that the threat of a potential 
layoff significantly increases the probability of accepting the voluntary separation 
program. Although those who would have been discharged would have 
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received severance pay, the higher the threat of being separated involuntarily, 





Ill. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
Data on the population of VSI/SSB eligible personnel were obtained from 
Defense Data Manpower Center (DMDC), Monterey. The data files contained 
information on the separation behavior and the demographics of VSI/SSB 
eligible Navy officers in FY93 and Navy and Air Force enlisted personnel in 
FY92, the first year of the program for each respective group. The initial Navy 
officer data set consisted of 15,177 observations of eligible personnel and 126 
variables. Because this analysis assumes individuals will retire at 20 YOS, 
those observations with more than 19 YOS were deleted from the sample. This 
reduced the size of the officer file to 13,297 observations. Additionally, missing 
or erroneous data reduced the size of the officer file suitable for empirical 
analysis to 12,635. The initial data file for Navy enlisted personnel was 
comprised of 37,886 observations of eligible personnel with 147 variables. 
Eliminating erroneous or missing data reduced the data set to 34,671 
observations. To estimate the effect of RIF on separation behavior, the initial 
data file on Air Force enlisted personnel eligible for the· bonus in FY92 was 
restricted to only those individuals who explicitly faced a threat of involuntary 
separation. This limited the file on Air Force VSIISSB eligible enlisted personnel 
to service members in paygrades E-5 and E-6 with 9 to 14 years of active 
service whose occupational specialties were grouped into tiers 2-5 (West, 
1992). Restricting the data file on Navy enlisted personnel to individuals with 9 
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to 14 YOS and merging it with the Air Force file resulted in a combined data set 
with 70,116 observations, roughly one half of the original141,360. 
Table 3.1 shows some descriptive statistics about the data set of Navy 
officers in FY93. The acceptance rate was only 6.71 percent. A t-test of 
differences in means for each variable is displayed in column 5. Using only the 
significant differences, we find that those who accepted the bonus and left the 
military were younger, had fewer years of active duty service, were more likely 
to be single or divorced, were more likely to be an unrestricted line officer, and 
had fewer dependents. 
Table 3.1 Mean Values (or Proportions) of Selected Variables of VSIISSB 





Years of Service 12.73 
Gender(%) 88.64 
(male=1) 
Marital Status (%) 81.64 
(married= 1 ) 
Unrestricted Line (%) 64.86 
(URL=1) 



























Dependents 3.02 2.57 3.05 o.ooof 
Military Spouse(%) 5.62 5.90 5.60 0.7170 
(mil. spouse=1) 
a those who accepted the VSI/SSB bonus and left the military 
*means for takers and non-takers are significantly different at the 99% confidence level 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
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Also members of a minority group and female officers had, on balance, lower 
acceptance rates, but the difference in means is not statistically significant. 
Those married to a military spouse are also found to have statistically similar 
separation behavior to those married to a civilian spouse. 
Table 3.2 lists descriptive statistics for VSI/SSB eligible Navy enlisted 
personnel in FY92. One difference between tables 3.1 and 3.2 is that the 
acceptance rate for enlisted personnel is nearly twice that of officers. 
Table 3.2 Mean Values of Selected Variables of VSIISSB Eligible Navy 
Enlisted Personnel in FY92 
Total Takersa Non-Takers t-test 
Observations 34,671 4,320 30,351 
(100%) (12.46%) (87.54%) 
Age 32.56 32.40 32.58 0.0022. 
Years of Service 12.86 12.69 12.88 o.ooof 
Gender(%) 89.72 86.30. 90.21 0.0001 
(male=1) 
Marital Status (%) 78.70 75.97 79.09 0.0001 . 
(married=1) 
AFQT Score 55.25 57.42 54.95 o.ooof 
Minority(%) 29.57 18.17 31.19 0.0001 
(minority=1) 
Dependents 3.19 3.14 3.20 0.0266 •• 
Military Spouse(%) 5.72 6.64 . 5.59 0.0088 
(mil. spouse=1) 
Technical Rating(%) 19.75 22.50 19.35 0.0001 
(high tech=1) 
3 those who accepted the VSI/SSB bonus and left the military 
• means for takers and non-takers are significantly different at the 99% confidence level 
-means for takers and non-takers are significantly different at the 95% confidence level 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
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While officers who took the separation bonus tended to be much younger and 
have fewer YOS, the differences in these variables for enlisted personnel were 
small. But, because of the larger sample size, theses differences are significant 
for the enlisted group. The same applies for the number of dependents: officers 
who leave tend to have fewer dependents whereas the difference in the number 
of c~ildren of enlistees is very slight. As was true for officers, married enlisted 
personnel are much less inclined to accept the financial incentive. Those 
married to a military spouse and those with higher AFQT scores were, according 
to expectations, more inclined to leave. In contrast to Navy officers, enlisted 
males and- minorities had significantly lower acceptance rates. Additionally, 
those enlistees who were trained in a technical MOS had higher program 
acceptance rates than non-technical enlisted personnel. 
Table 3.3 shows relevant descriptive statistics of VSIISSB eligible Air 
Force enlisted personnel in FY92 who explicitly faced a threat of involuntary 
separation. Similar to Navy enlisted personnel, Air Force enlisted who leave are, 
on balance, younger, have fewer YOS, are more likely to be unmarried, and are 
less likely to be minorities. As was true for Navy enlisted personnel, females in 
the Air Force had a significantly higher acceptance rate than males. However, 
contradicting the findings on Navy enlisted personnel, the USAF "leavers" had, 
on average, lower AFQT scores, had more dependent children, were less likely 
to be married to a military spouse (significant at the 90% confidence level), and 
were more likely to serve in a non-technical MOS. 
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Table 3.3 Mean Values (or Proportions) of Selected Variables of 
VSIISSB and RIF Eligible Air Force Enlisted Personnel in FY92 
Total Takersa Non-Takers t-test 
Observations 43,842 7,536 36,306 
(100%) (17.19%) (82.81%) 
Age 30.97 30.72 31.02 0.0001 
Years of Service 11.86 11.65 11.90 0.0001. 
Gender(%) 86.40 85.34 86.62 0.0040. 
(male=1) 
Marital Status (%) 81.40 79.63 81.77 0.0001 
(married=1) 
AFQT Score 55.29 54.78 .. 55.39 0.0119 
Minority (%) 26.57 19.94 27.95 0.0001 
(minority=1) 
-
Dependents 3.11 3.15 3.10 0.0011 
. 
Military Spouse(%) 11.60 10.96 11.73 0.0547 
(mil. spouse=1) 
Technical MOS (%) 46.07 41.07 47.11 o.ooof 
(high tech=1) 
Tier 2 (%) 34.23 24.27 36.30 o.ooof 
Tier 3 (%) 3.74 3.73 3.75 0.9430 
Tier 4 (%) 25.24 28.90 . 24.48 0.0001 
Tier 5 (%) 36.79 43.10 35.45 0.0001 . 
~those who accepted the VSI/SSB bonus and left the military 
.. means for takers and non-takers are significantly different at the 99% confidence level 
means for takers and non-takers are significantly different at the 95% confidence level 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
Surprisingly, the personnel who were grouped in Tier 2 were less inclined to 
leave while service members in Tier 3 were basically neutral toward the program 
(statistically insignificant difference in proportions). However, those in Tier 4 
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and Tier 5 had, according to expectations, higher separation rates, with those in 
Tier 5 having the largest values. 
B. ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
1. Development of Model 
The specification of the empirical model follows the findings of prior 
literature on the ACOL model. It is assumed that the utility-maximization 
framework underlying the ACOL model significantly explains and predicts the 
decision behavior towards a voluntary separation incentive program and that 
many of the key factors in the studies presented in the literature review are 
applicable to the decision to accept a voluntary separation bonus. Using 
Equation (6) in Chapter II, three separate models were specified: one for Navy 
officers, one for Navy enlisted personnel and a third for a merged data set of 
Navy and USAF enlisted personnel. In the models the probability of staying in 
the military was expressed as: 
r_. = P(ACOL."' > 8.) =Po +P1 (ACOL~}+..IL.X. +e. l l l Z -l-Z l (8) 
where r; represents _the probability of staying for individual i, ACOL;* is the 
maximum ACOL value for individual i, 8; is the individual's net preference for 
civilian life over military life, .& and~ are the respective vectors of parameters 
and individual characteristics, and e; is a random error term that is assumed to 
be distributed normally N(l!, cf) with mean l1 and variance cf. 
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Table 3.4 displays an overview of the variables used in this analysis. 
These variables were assumed to significantly affect the decision to take a 
voluntary separation incentive. 
















= 0 if accepted the separation bonus 
= 1 otherwise 
Annualized Cost of Leaving ($) 
= 1 if male 
= 0 if female 
= 1 if ethnic minority 
= 0 otherwise 
number of dependent children 
= 1 if spouse also in military 
= 0 otherwise 
= 1 if unrestricted line officer 
= 0 otherwise 
score on Armed Forces Qualification 
Test (in percent) 
= 1 if in technical occupation 
= 0 otherwise 
= 1 if member of tier 2 
= 0 if J!lember of Navy or other tier 
= 1 if member of tier 3 
= 0 if member of Navy or other tier 
= 1 if member of tier 4 
= 0 if member of Navy or other tier 
= 1 if member of tier 5 
= 0 if member of Navy or other tier 
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2. Variable Construction and Definitions 
a. The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable STAY was constructed from the 
PROGRAM variable in the original data set. STAY was coded 1 if the individual 
did not leave the military, and coded 0 if he/she separated with either the VSI or 
the SSB option of the program. 
b. Calculation of the ACOL Variable 
To calculate the Annualized Cost of Leaving it was assumed that 
individuals form their expectations of future income streams based on current 
information about military pay and promotion possibilities and civilian wage 
opportunities. Since VSIISSB eligibility criteria focused on mid-career 
personnel, it can be assumed that the typical offeree in the absence of the 
bonus program would have stayed in the military until becoming vested for 
retirement benefits. Thus, the individual's decision was assumed to be between 
either accepting the incentive and leaving the military immediately or staying 
until YOS 20. This follows the assumption used by Goldberg (1982) in his 
analysis of mid-career (third-term) personnel. 
To estimate the expected future military income stream, the Navy 
Officer Master File (OMF) for FY93, the Navy Enlisted Master File (EMF) for 
FY92 and the Air Force EMF for FY92 were obtained from the Defense 
Manpower Data Center in Monterey, CA. Each data set was used to compute 
the paygrade distribution by gender in each relevant year of service (YOS). this 
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provided the probability of being in a certain paygrade by YOS. This probability 
was then combined with FY92 and FY93 military pay tables to obtain data on 
monthly basic pay, Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) conditioned on 
dependent status, and Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) deductions. 
These data were combined to calculate the expected annual military income for 
each YOS. Consistent with Warner and Goldberg (1984), special pays were 
neglected in the military pay variable since they are relatively small in regard to 
monthly basic pay and BAQ and were rather designed as a compensating wage 
differential for the undesirable job characteristics of certain military occupational 
specialties.- Expected future annual military retirement benefits were assumed to 
be 50 percent of the expected annual military basic pay in YOS 20. 
Thus, the present value of the total military income stream 
associated with staying until YOS 20 in the military can be approximated by 
summing the discounted expected values of annual military pay until YOS 20 
and those of the military retirement benefits from retirement age until life 
expectancy age (currently 73 and 78 years of age for men and women, 
respectively). Following Mairs et al (1992), Goldberg (1982) and Warner and 
Goldberg (1984), a discount rate of ten percent was chosen throughout the 
analysis. 
Assuming that a military retiree remains in the civilian labor market 
until age 65, a civilian age-earnings profile was calculated using the 1990 Public 
Use Microdata Samples (PUMS). PUMS data are based on the decennial 
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census of the U.S. and contain records representing 5 percent or 1 percent 
samples of the housing units in the U.S. and the persons living in them. 
Restricting the population in the PUMS data file to a representative sample of 
only military veterans reduced the size of the data set from 866,383 to 51,212 
observations. Controlling for gender, levels of education and whether the 
individual receives military retirement benefits or not, the estimated age-
earnings profile provided approximations of the future civilian income and 
retirement benefits stream of male and female veterans. Thus, the total present 
value of the civilian income stream to be expected after military retirement was 
calculated -as the sum of the discounted annual civilian pay from military 
retirement age until age 65, plus the discounted annual civilian retirement 
benefits from age 65 until the respective life expectancy age. The present 
values of the military and civilian income streams were then summed to 
approximate the individual's perceived pecuniary value of staying in the military. 
The same age-earnings profile was then used to calculate the 
annual expected civilian wage of military veterans with less than 20 YOS (i.e., 
the value of the civilian option). Consistent with Goldberg and Warner (1987), it 
was found that veterans who leave the military early have higher civilian 
earnings than those who stay until YOS 20. Discounting the individual's annual 
civilian income (conditioned on age) and summing them from the individual's 
current age until life expectancy age, provides the perceived present value of 
the civilian income plus civilian retirement stream. Since the majority of those 
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individuals who accepted a separation incentive chose the SSB lump-sum 
payment over the VSI annual installments, only the Selective Separation Bonus 
each individual would receive in case he/she accepted the program was 
included in the civilian pay stream. The SSB computation was based on 
paygrade and YOS in the relevant current fiscal year. The SSB payment was 
added to the present value of the civilian income and retirement benefit stream 
to obtain the total present value of the returns to be expected if the individual 
leaves the milita')'. 
The cost of leaving (COL) was calculated for each individual as the 
difference between the present value of staying until 20 YOS and that of leaving 
immediately. Conditioned on the number of years remaining until 20, the COL 
values were annualized using the ten percent personal discount rate to obtain 
the ACOL values. It is hypothesized that ACOL positively affects the probability 
of staying, i.e., the higher the Annualized Cost of Leaving, the less likely the 
individual will accept the separation bonus. 
c. Demographic Variables 
Several demographic factors are also included in the retention 
models to capture differences in non-pecuniary factors affecting the separation 
decision. These include the following. 
(1) MALE (gender). A dummy variable was added to control 
for gender-specific differences in separation behavior; MALE = 1 if male, = 0 
otherwise. Since the lower expected civilian earnings of women are already 
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incorporated in the calculation of the ACOL variable, one might expect MALE to 
be insignificant in the probit retention equation. However, because women are 
historically the provider of supplementary income in a household and, thus, are 
more inclined to take a voluntary separation bonus, the MALE variable may have 
a positive effect on the decision to stay. 
(2) MINORITY (member of an ethnic minority). A dummy 
variable was added to control for racial and ethnic differences in the decision to 
leave; MINORITY = 1 if the individual's ethnic origin is non-Caucasian, = 0 
otherwise. Because the potential civilian earnings of minorities tend to be 
restricted and this factor is not incorporated in the calculation of the ACOL 
variable, minority status is hypothesized to be positively correlated with the 
probability of staying. In other words, their average ACOL values would tend to 
be higher than those of comparable majority men and women, making them less 
likely to leave. Thus, the minority variable is included to control for the 
differences in civilian and military opportunities for minorities. 
(3) MARRIED (marital status). MARRIED = 1 if the 
individual is married, with or without children, and = 0 if he/she is single or 
divorced. Although the calculation of the ACOL variable controls for marital 
status-specific differences in military and civilian income streams, military fringe 
and in-kind benefits (such as health care for the spouse and dependents) may 
induce married personnel to reject the VSI/SSB program, on balance, more often 
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than unmarried personnel. Thus, the coefficient of MARRIED is expected to 
positively affect the decision to stay. 
(4) DEPS (number of dependents) is a continuous variable 
for the number of dependents. Previous research shows that, with increasing 
family size, individuals seem to prefer the relatively certain and steady military 
pay over civilian wage. The military's medical health plan and other non-
pecuniary benefits are also found to decrease the service members probability 
of leaving. Thus, the coefficient of DEPS is hypothesized to have a positive 
sign, indicating that the more children a service member has, the less likely 
he/she is to separate. 
(5) MILSPOUS (military spouse) is a dummy variable coded 
1 if the service member is married to a military spouse, with or without children, 
and 0 otherwise. Due to the difficulties in trying to lead a "normal" marriage 
when both partners are members of the military, it is assumed that if one of them 
is offered the VSI/SSB program, he/she may be more inclined to accept the 
bonus and leave. Thus, the coefficient is hypothesized to be negative. 
(6) URL (unrestricted line) is a dummy variable, coded URL 
= 1 if the individual is an unrestricted line officer and = 0 otherwise. This 
variable is included in the Navy officer model to control for differences in military 
tastes of restricted and unrestricted line officers. If unrestricted line officers, due 
to the rigorous nature of their jobs, have stronger preferences for military life 
than their restricted line counterparts, then URL will positively ·affect the 
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probability of staying. However, if the job characteristics associated with 
unrestricted line duty are more onerous than those associated with restricted 
line occupational specialties, unrestricted line officers may be more likely to 
leave. 
(7) AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) is a continuous 
variable representing an enlisted service member's percentage score on the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test at his/her entry into the military. If, as feared by 
policy makers at the introduction of the VSIISSB program, those with higher 
aptitude have better employment opportunities in the civilian labor market, and 
thus, are more inclined to leave the military, the coefficient of AFQT will be 
negative. 
(8) HITECH (technical rating) = 1 if the enlistee's military 
occupation is technical, = 0 otherwise. Extensive technical training in these 
ratings is assumed to be more transferable to the civilian labor market should 
lower the individual's reluctance to accept the program. Thus, the coefficient of 
HITECH is expected to be negative. 
(9) TIER2 to TIERS (tier 2, tier 3, tier 4, tierS) are dummy 
variables coded 1 if the enlistee is in the respective "tier'' group, coded 0 if 
he/she serves in the Navy or is in a different tier. The coefficients are expected 
to become increasingly negative, with TIERS having the largest negative value 
due to the associated rise in the threat of involuntary separation. 
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Summarizing, the specifications of the three STAY probit 
models are displayed below. The expected sign of each variable represents the 
preliminary hypothesis about its effect on the probability of staying. 
The probit model for Navy officers: 
+ ?!- + + + - ? 
STAY= j( ACOL, MALE, A.fiNORIJY, MARRIED, DEPS, A.fiLSPOUS, URL) (9) 
The probit model for Navy enlisted personnel differs from (9) by including AFQT 
and HITECH , but by excluding URL: 
+ ?!- + + 
+ - - -
(10) STAY= j( ACOL, MALE, A.fiNORIJY, MARRIED, 
DEPS, A.fiLSPOUS, AFQT, HITECH) 
The probit model that pools Navy and USAF enlisted personnel differs from (10) 
by including the TIER dummies: 
+ ?!- + + + -
STAY= f( ACOL, MALE, A.fiNORIJY, MARRIED, DEPS, lvf!LSPOUS, 
- - - - - -
(11) 
AFQT,HITECH, llER2, llER3, llER4, llER5) 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. ANALYTIC METHODS 
This chapter describes the estimation methods used in this thesis. It also 
discusses and interprets the results of the empirical analysis. 
Sections 8 and C present and discuss the findings on the effect of the 
VSI/SSB program on the voluntary separation behavior of Navy officers and 
enlisted personnel, respectively. To estimate these effects, the multivariate 
probit models (Equations 9-1 0 above) are estimated to determine the direction 
and the magnitude of the variables introduced in Chapter Ill. These models are 
estimated with data on VSI/SSB-eligible Navy officers in FY93 and enlisted 
personnel in FY92. This was the first year of the program for each respective 
group. The models estimate the effect of the separation program holding other 
factors constant. 
Section D presents and discusses the results of the influence of the threat 
of involuntary separation on voluntary separation behavior. The effect of the 
threat of involuntary separation in combination with the VSI/SSB program is 
estimated by merging data on \/SI/SSB eligible-Navy with data on Air Force 
enlisted personnel that were subject to involuntary separation in FY92. 
Controlling for differences in the level of the separation threat, holding all other 
factors constant, probit models are estimated to determine the direction and the 
magnitude of the Air Force's five-tier separation system and the related RIF on 
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voluntary separation behavior. This model was specified as Equation (11) 
above. 
This chapter also provides an analysis of the marginal probabilities 
associated with each explanatory variable in the various models. Contrary to 
linear probability models, where the direct effect of each independent variable 
on the probability of the event can be easily determined from the estimated 
coefficients, probit models must be evaluated at the mean values of the 
explanatory variable~. The marginal probability is the change in the probability 
of staying in the military associated with a one unit change in a specific 
independent variable, holding everything else constant. To obtain the marginal 
probabilities, the probability of staying in the military for the "notional" (or 
average) person (i.e., a fictitious individual whose values of the independent 
variables were set at the respective mean or median values of the entire 
population used for this model) are calculated. Holding everything else 
constant, each continuous variable is changed by one unit from its mean value 
and following this, the probability of staying for this "new'' individual will be 
calculated. For dummy variables, the value is changed from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0 
and the corresponding probability calculated. The difference in the two resulting 
probabilities is an estimate for the change in the probability of the outcome 
(STAY) for a one unit change in the specific explanatory variable. 
Additionally, this chapter estimates the average effects of the VSI/SSB 
program on the program acceptance rate. For each individual observation in the 
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three sample groups, the probability of accepting the financial bonus is predicted 
by using the respective estimated probit regression. This yields the individual's 
simulated probability of leaving the military with the inclusion of the SSB in the 
ACOL variable. The individual probability of accepting in the absence of the 
financial bonus is predicted by using the ACOL without including the SSB in the 
estimated probit models. Thus, the average effect of the VSIISSB program 
( PsSB) is estimated as in Equation ( 12) below: 
(12) 
where A; is the individual's simulated probability of leaving with the inclusion of 
the SSB in the calculation of the ACOL variable, P2; is his/her simulated 
probability of leaving without including the financial offer in the ACOL variable, 
and n stands for the number of observations in the respective sample. 
B. THE EFFECT OF THE VSIISSB PROGRAM ON THE VOLUNTARY 
SEPARATION BEHAVIOR OF NAVY OFFICERS IN FY93 
This section presents the results of the analysis of VSIISSB-eligible Navy 
officers in FY93, the first year in which this program was offered to them. Before 
analyzing the separation behavior in a multivariate context, a bivariate analysis 
of average ACOL values and their associated separation rates, both conditioned 
on years of service, was conducted as a preliminary analysis of the relationship 
between ACOL and separation behavior. As can be seen from Table 4.1, the 
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average ACOL values initially decrease until 12 YOS, after which they start to 
rise. 
Table 4.1 Average ACOL Values and Program Acceptance Rates 
by YOS for Navy Officers in FY93 
YOS observations ACOL Acceptance Rate (%) 
7 296 5,511 18,24 
8 1,538 6,881 19.12 
9 1,143 6,449 12.16 
10 1,120 6,034 8.48 
11 1,039 5,793 8.08 
12 1,014 5,301 4.24 
13 1,078 5,719 2.69 
14 1,168 5,833 1.97 
15 1,183 5,961 2.45 
16 890 7,759 2.47 
17 739 9,787 1.62 
18 735 13,297 1.50 
19 692 24,276 1.88 
total 12,635 7,794 6.71 
Source: calculations by author, derived from data obtained from DMDC 
Table 4.1 illus~rates that, on balance, acceptance rates decline with YOS, 
but the ACOL values initially decrease until YOS 12 and increase subsequently 
until YOS 19. The rise in the ACOL after YOS 12 can be explained by the 
increasing attractiveness of the military retirement program. However, the 
relatively large variability in the acceptance rate, given the almost constant 
ACOL values of certain YOS ranges, implies that the variation in the ACOL 
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value only partially explains the change in the acceptance rate. Thus, the 
multivariate models are specified to control for other demographic and taste-
related variables. 
The multivariate probit model is used to identify the factors affecting the 
separation behavior of VSI/SSB-eligible Navy officers in FY93. The dependent 
variable represents a binary choice, to stay or leave. This choice was modeled 
as a function of the Annualized Cost of Leaving and a vector of demographic 
variables, which were listed in Equation (9) above. Table 4.2 presents the 
estimated probit coefficients of the explanatory variables, the significance level 
of each cqefficient, and the calculated marginal effects of each variable. With 
the exception of the ACOL variable, the value of the marginal probability 
represents the change in the probability of staying for a one unit change in the 
respective independent variable. Since one major research issue of this thesis 
is to determine the separation rate due to the program, i.e., what the separation 
rate would have been in the absence of the VSI/SSB program, the marginal 
effect of the ACOL variable was computed by calculating the difference in the 
simulated probabilities of a "notional" individual with and without the inclusion of 
the Special Separation Bonus in the ACOL calculation. Thus, this marginal 
probability is an estimate of the effect of the VSI/SSB program on the decision 
behavior of bonus eligible personnel. 
As hypothesized, the ACOL variable was found to be statistically 
significant and its effect on the probability of staying is positive. Although 
49 
relatively small, the probit coefficient of the ACOL variable is similar to the 
findings of Mairs et al (1992) for a sample of U.S. Army officers. 
Table4.2 Probit Regression Results of Navy Officers in FY93 
Variable Coefficient Wald X2 Pr >x2 ~pi /~Xa 
{Marginal Effect} 
INTERCEPT 1.2308 165.78 0.0001 
ACOL 0.000012 17.54 0.0001 * 3.212b 
MALE 0.0330 0.23 0.6316 0.457 
MARRIED 0.2543 18.46 o.ooof 4.126 
MINORITY 0.0269 0.16 0.6938 0.357 
DEPS 0.0702 16.44 0.0003* 0.903 
MILSPOUS -0.0107 0.02 0.9005 -0.145 
* URL -0.3548 75.21 0.0001 -3.675 
Model Chi-Square= 208.045 with 7 OF (p = 0.0001); n = 12,635 
a change in probability of staying for a one unit change in the explanatory variable, calculated at 
the mean values. 
b change in probability of staying in the absence of the separation bonus, calculated at the mean 
values. 
·significant at the 99% confidence level 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
The marginal effect for the ACOL variable as listed in column 5 of Table 
4.2 provides an estimate of the increase in the likelihood of staying if DoD would 
not have instituted the financial bonus. Table 4.3 displays both the simulated 
program acceptance rates for the notional person (repeated from Table 4.2) and 
the predicted probability of leaving averaged over the sample group with and 
without the inclusion of the separation bonus in the ACOL variable. This is 
called the average treatment effect. 
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Table 4.3 Predicted Probabilities of Accepting(%) 
Difference in Probabilities 
With SSB Without SSB With and Without the SSB 
Notional Person 
Averaged over Sample 
7.074 3.862 3.212 
6.700 4.623 2.077 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
Thus, the VSIISSB program increased the probability of leaving for the notional 
person by 3.212 percentage points, a relative increase of 83.17 percent. The 
average program. effect is estimated to be an increase in the acceptance rate by 
2.077 percentage points, a relative increase of 44.93 percent. 
Using these measures of the program effect we can calculate the costs 
and benefits of the separation bonus program. Using the more conservative 
estimate of 2.077 points, it is estimated that out of the 848 officers who left, 585 
would have done so even in the absence of the bonus. Hence, 263 service 
members were induced to leave by the voluntary separation bonus. With an 
average SSB amount of $56,813 for officers who left, the Navy paid the 848 
"leavers" a total of $48.18 million in financial incentives. Since about two thirds 
(68.99%) would have left anyway, about $33.24 million accrued to separatees as 
economic rents. On the other hand, about one third of those who separated 
would have stayed in the absence of the program. Thus, the economic benefits 
of the program accrue in the form of the future military pay and retirement 
benefits that are saved by inducing those 263 people to leave. These benefits 
were calculated by using the average demographic characteristics of the group 
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of leavers. However, comparing the immediate program cost of $48.18 million 
with the long-term benefits we must calculate the present value of the future 
savings stream. Using the official government real discount rate of 3.8 percent 
for a period of 30 years or more, the average present value of the future savings 
per individual was calculated to be $720,435 per leaver.2 Thus, the economic 
benefit of the separation bonus program was estimated to be $189.5 million 
(263 leavers * $720,435), almost four times the immediate cost of the program. 
For the program to break-even, at these acceptance rates it would have needed 
only 67 individuals to be stimulated to leave ($48.18 M I $0.720 M). 
We now address the coefficients of the demographic variables. The 
variable MALE has a negative coefficient but is statistically insignificant. This 
indicates that after controlling for the typically lower civilian income for women, 
female Navy officers show statistically similar separation behavior to males, thus 
contradicting the findings of Mairs et al (1992) on the effect of gender on 
voluntary separation behavior of Air Defense Artillery officers. However, Mairs 
et al's conclusion that females are more likely to stay can be attributed to the fact 
that the authors did not control for the gender-specific differences in post-military 
earnings in their ACOL calculation, thus their coefficient for gender will be 
upward biased, since it will "pick up" the effect of differences in the cost of 
leaving. 
2 The real discount rate to be used in evaluating time-distributed costs and benefrts for 
Government agencies was taken out of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular 
No. A-94, October 29, 1992. 
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The MARRIED and DEPS variables are both statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level. The coefficients of both variables are positive, as 
hypothesized, indicating that being married and a larger number of dependents 
both raise the probability of staying. Since differences in both civilian and 
military earnings due to marital status are incorporated in the calculation of the 
ACOL variable, the positive coefficient of the MARRIED variable indicates that 
married personnel have stronger preferences for military life. Military fringe and 
in-kind benefits appear to be more highly valued by married than by single 
personnel as well as by officers with dependents. The military's medical health 
plan for dependents is hypothesized to be a major reason for this difference in 
voluntary separation behavior. 
Contrary to expectations, the coefficient of the MINORITY variable was 
found to be positive, but statistically insignificant. Thus, being a member of a 
minority group does not significantly affect the decision to accept the VSI/SSB 
program. The reason for this behavior is unclear, but it could be that officers, 
who typically have college degrees, perceive race-specific differences in post-
military earnings to be insignificant at their levels of education. 
The MILSPOUS variable is statistically insignificant, thus indicating that 
spouses in a dual military partnership have the same program acceptance rates 
as officers who are married to a civilian spouse. This contradicts previous 
research on enlisted personnel (Mehay and Hogan, 1995) and indicates that the 
pursuit of a successful career seems to be more prominent for officers than for 
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enlisted personnel, making either partner in a dual-military relationship reluctant 
to sacrifice his/her own career for the sake of their marriage. 
The coefficient of the URL variable is statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level and its sign is negative. This indicates that officers in combat-
type military occupations are more inclined to accept the VSI/SSB program. The 
reason may be that the more rigorous life associated with unrestricted line 
occupations, for example long sea deployments, creates a strong distaste for 
military life. 
C. THE EFFECT OF THE VSI/SSB PROGRAM ON THE VOLUNTARY 
SEPARATION BEHAVIOR OF NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN FY92 
This section presents the findings on the effect of the VSIISSB program 
on the voluntary separation behavior of Navy enlisted personnel in FY92, the 
first year the program was offered. Similar to- the previous analysis of Navy 
officer's program acceptance behavior, a bivariate analysis of average ACOL 
values and voluntary separation rates, both conditioned on YOS, was conducted 
prior to specifying a multivariate model. Table 4.4 lists the number of 
observations, the average- ACOL values and the program -acceptance rates by 
YOS. 
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Table 4.4 Average ACOL Values and Program Acceptance Rates 
by YOS for Navy Enlisted Personnel in FY92 
YOS observations ACOL Acceptance Rate 
10 4,784 4,889 15.18% 
11 5,943 6,524 13.55% 
12 5,644 7,967 12.33% 
13 5,167 10,332 10.99% 
14 4,736 12,832 11.25% 
15 4,179 17,081 12.18% 
16 3,029 23,759 10.83% 
17 1,189 35,485 13.04% 
total 34,671 11,734 12.46% 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
Table 4.4 shows that although mean ACOL values rise with YOS, the 
program acceptance rates remain relatively constant, indicating that the ACOL 
may not have a significant influence on the voluntary separation behavior of the 
VSI/SSB-eligible group of Navy enlisted personnel in FY92. However, this 
bivariate analysis does not control for differences in gender, race or other 
demographic characteristics. Thus, unobserved differences in demographics 
may be the source of the small variation in the average program acceptance 
rates. Table 4.5 shows the results of estimating the multivariate probit 
regression model, the estimated coefficients, and the marginal effects from each 
variable. 
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Table 4.5 Probit Regression Results of Navy Enlisted Personnel in FY92 
Variable Coefficient Wald r! Pr >r! APi /AXa 
{Marginal Effect} 
INTERCEPT 0.7813 294.07 0.0001 
ACOL 0.00000335 8.06 0.0045 * 0.534b 
MALE 0.2553 70.62 o.ooof 6.158 
MARRIED 0.1193 20.87 * 0.0001 2.682 
DEPS -0.0239 10.51 0.0012 * -0.509 
MINORITY 0.3767 293.95 o.ooof 6.322 
MILSPOUS -0.0386 0.96 0.3262 -0.831 
HITECH -0.0557 6.09 0.0135** -1.209 
AFQT 0.000135 0.12 0.7331 0.0028 
Model Chi-Square= 440.709 with 8 OF (p = 0.0001); n = 34,671 
a change in probability of staying for a one unit change in the explanatory variable, calculated at 
the mean values. 
b change in probability of staying in the absence of the separation bonus. 
*significant at the 99% confidence level 
- significant at the 95% confidence level 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
The coefficient of the ACOL variable is statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level and, as expected, its sign is positive. The small magnitude of 
the ACOL coefficient, 0.0000035, confirms the previous findings presented in 
Table 4.4 that the ACOL apparently has only a relatively minor influence on 
VSI/SSB program acceptance rates. Table 4.6 illustrates the predicted 
probabilities of accepting with and without the SSB using the notional person 
approach and the average predicted probability over the complete sample 
(average treatment effect). 
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Table 4.6 Predicted Probabilities of Accepting(%) 
Notional Person 
Averaged over Sample 
Difference in Probabilities 
With SSB Without SSB With and Without the SSB 
12.905 12.374 0.531 
12.459 11.957 0.502 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
Table 4.6 shows that the offer of the SSB increased the average 
individual's probability of accepting by 0.531 percentage points, a relative 
increase of 4.29 percent. The average program effect is estimated to be an 
increase in the separation rate of 0.502 percentage points, a relative increase of 
4.20 percent. Thus, of the 4,320 enlistees who chose to accept the program in 
FY 92, it is estimated that 4,146 would have left even in the absence of the 
bonus; the financial incentive induced only 17 4 sailors to separate. With an 
average SSB of $36,223, the total cost that the_ Navy incurred by paying those 
who left the voluntary separation bonus is estimated to be $156.5 million. The 
economic benefits again consist of the cost savings that accrue to the Navy due 
to inducing 17 4 service members to leave. Using the same procedures to 
calculate the present value of the cost savings for enlisted personnel as in the 
Navy officer file, it is estimated that the Navy saved, on average, a present value 
of $537,294 per "Ieaver''. Thus, the present value of the economic benefit for 
the Navy is estimated to be $93.49 million, yielding a benefit-cost ratio of 0.60. 
However, this estimated program effect seems to be implausibly low. As 
shown in Table 4.3, individuals with comparatively high ACOL values had, on 
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average, similar program acceptance rates than enlistees with lower ACOL 
values. Since the amount of the financial separation bonus increases with 
tenure, it may be possible that the high amount of the bonus has a "blinding" 
effect on the individual, thus making him/her incapable of rationally choosing 
between staying or leaving. In this case, the effect of the VSIISSB program on 
voluntary separation behavior would be significantly higher. On the other side, 
the small variation in the acceptance rates by YOS may be explained by a 
relatively stronger distaste for military life with increasing tenure, the reasons for 
which may hinge on repeated sea duty. Contradicting evidence on retention and 
reenlistment rates, this would mean that those with higher values of ACOL and 
longer tenure have stronger net preferences for civilian life and probably would 
have left even without a financial incentive, if they were just let out of their 
enlistment contract. In this case, the effect of the financial separation bonus on 
the decision to leave would be, as estimated above, minimal. 
In contrast to the above findings on VSIISSB eligible officers, gender 
significantly affects the voluntary separation behavior of Navy enlisted 
personnel. The coefficient of MALE is positive, indicating that male enlistees are 
more likely to stay, thus duplicating Mehay and Hogan's (1995) findings on 
gender. Since gender-specific differences in post-military earnings were 
included in the calculation of the ACOL variable, the positive coefficient of the 
MALE variable shows that the female population of the sample had, on average, 
higher net preferences for civilian life. The reasons for this difference in 
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male/female voluntary separation behavior between enlisted personnel and 
officers are unclear but could be that female enlistees, in contrast to female 
officers, are more likely to be the provider of supplemental income in a 
household, less likely to pursue a career of their own, and thus, more inclined to 
accept the VSI/SSB program. 
The coefficient of the MARRIED variable is statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level and its sign is positive, indicating that married personnel 
are more likely to stay. This duplicates the above presented findings on the 
VSIISSB eligible Navy officers in FY92. Military fringe and in-kind benefits are 
apparently -perceived to be of higher value to married personnel, which may 
explain their reluctance to leave. 
In contrast to expectations and to the respective findings on Navy officers, 
the number of dependent children was found to significantly reduce the 
probability of staying for Navy enlisted personnel, thus indicating that service 
members with more children are more likely to accept the VSIISSB program. 
This reproduces the findings of Mehay and Hogan (1995) and may be explained 
by the fact that the frequent separation associated with active duty are more 
disruptive to families with children than to married couples without children. 
The MINORITY variable is statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
level. The sign of the coefficient is positive, as hypothesized, thus indicating 
that members of a minority group are less likely to accept the voluntary 
separation program. This supports previous research which suggests that 
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minorities are more likely than whites to stay in the military because of perceived 
higher levels of discrimination in the civilian labor market. 
The MILSPOUS variable is statistically insignificant. Contrary to Mehay 
and Hogan's (1995) findings on VSIISSB eligible Navy enlisted personnel, 
enlistees married to a military spouse were not more likely to accept the 
voluntary separation bonus than those who in a military-civilian partnership. 
The HITECH variable is statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level. As hypothesized, the sign of the coefficient is negative, indicating that 
extensive technical training which is supposed to be more transferable to the 
civilian labor market, lowers the individual's probability of staying in the military. 
The AFQT variable is statistically insignificant, indicating that Navy 
enlistees with higher aptitude, although speculated to face better civilian 
employment opportunities, are no more likely to leave the military than those 
with lower AFQT scores. Thus, the fear of policymakers that the introduction of 
the VSIISSB program could possibly recreate the "hollow force" of the 1970's 
appears to be unfounded. 
D. THE EFFECT OF THE THREAT OF REDUCTIONS-IN-FORCE (RIF) ON 
THE VOLUNTARY SEPARATION BEHAVIOR OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL 
IN FY92 
This section presents and discusses the findings on how the threat of 
involuntary separation affected enlisted personnels' decisions to accept the 
VSIISSB program. As previously mentioned, data files on VSI/SSB-eligible Navy 
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and USAF enlisted personnel in FY92 were combined into a merged data set 
that was restricted to observations of individuals who satisfied both Navy and Air 
Force VSIISSB eligibility criteria and of Air Force enlisted who were subject to 
the threat of being involuntary separated. This limited the combined data set to 
service members in pay grades E-5 or E-6 with 1 0 to 14 years of active service 
(West, 1992). 
Table 4.7 illustrates how the subpopulations of "takers" and "non-takers" 
are comprised of Navy and Air Force personnel and how the acceptance 
decision differed by tier. Column 1 shows that about 37.5 percent of the total 
sample are Navy members while the remaining 62.5 percent are comprised of 
Air Force enlisted. This proportion is further split into the respective tiers. 
I 
Column 2 and 3 display how the subpopulations of "takers" and "non-takers" are 
comprised of. As expected, Navy enlisted personnel are more likely to stay 
while comparable Air Force members are more likely to accept the VSIISSB 
program. 
Splitting the USAF population into the respective tiers reveals that those 
service members in tier 2 are less likely to leave while those in tiers 4 and 5 are 
more likely to accept the separation bonus. The acceptance rates for personnel 
grouped into tier 3 do not significantly differ in means. 
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Table4.7 Composition of VSI/SSB Program Takersa and Non-Takers 
Total Takers Non-Takers t-test 
Observations 70,116 10,864 59,252 
(100%) (15.49%) (84.51%) 
Navy 37.47% 30.63% 38.73% 0.0001 
USAF 62.53% 69.37% 61.27% 0.0001 * 
Tier2 21.40% 16.84% 22.24% 0.0001 * 
Tier3 2.34% 2.59% 2.30% 0.9430 
Tier4 15.78% 20.05% 15.00% 0.0001 
TierS 23.01% 29.89% 21.73% 0.0001 * 
a those who accepted the VSI!SSB bonus and left the military 
·averages for takers and non-takers are significantly different at the 99% confidence level 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
To estimate the effect of the threat of RIF on VSI/SSB acceptance rates in 
' 
a multivariate context, two models that differed only in the way the ACOL 
variable is computed, are specified. In Model I, the ACOL variable is calculated 
using the same procedures as in the previous models on Navy officers and 
enlisted personnel. Included in the model specification are dummy variables 
(TIER2-TIER5) to control for being in a specific tier, with Navy enlisted 
personnel being the base case. However, since the threat of involuntary 
separation typically decreases an individual's true cost-of-leaving, the estimated 
probit coefficients of the dummy variables for TIER2-TIER5 are expected to be 
upward biased. To reduce this upward bias, estimates of the tier-specific 
probabilities of being involuntarily separated are included in the ACOL 
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calculations in Modell I. The returns of staying RS;* for an individual who faces a 
future risk of being discharged is calculated using the following algorithm: 
(13) 
where Pti is the tier-specific probability of being RIF'd for individual i, RLi are the 
returns of leaving the military immediately, SevPay; is the amount of severance 
' pay the service member would receive in the event he/she would be involuntarily 
discharged at some future point, and RSi are the returns of staying for an 
individual who faces no threat of involuntary separation. Equation (13) will tend 
to reduce the ACOL for those service members who are threatened by 
involuntary separation. Thus, the coefficient of this adjusted ACOL is expected 
to capture the true increase in the acceptance rate associated with VSI/SSB and 
the resulting probit coefficients of TIER2 to TIERS are expected to be unbiased 
estimators of the effect of involuntary separation on VSI/SSB program 
acceptance behavior. Since the size of the RIF depended on the success of the 
VSI/SSB program, the tier-specific threat of being involuntarily separated was 
not quantifiable in early FY92, the time period on which this analysis focuses. 
Thus, Model II ass~mes th~t the probability of RIF was 20, 30, 40, and 50 
percent for tiers 2 - 5, respectively. 
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1. Modell: Calculating the ACOL Value Without Including the 
Tier-Specific Threat of Involuntary Separation 
Table 4.8 lists the results of the multivariate probit model on VSIISSB 
eligible Navy and Air Force enlisted personnel without including the Air Force's 
threat of involuntary separation in the calculation of the ACOL variable. 
Table 4.8 Probit Regression Results of Navy and Air Force Enlisted 
Personnel in FY92 
Variable Coefficient Wald X2 Pr >x2 i1Pi/i1X8 
INTERCEPT 0.5878 200.86 0.0001 
ACOL 0.000016 85.67 0.0001 
. 1.812b 
MALE 0.2699 140.09 o.ooof 6.545 
MARRIED 0.1885 101.63 
. 
0.0001 4.385 
DEPS -0.0352 46.67 0.0001 -0.753 
MINORITY 0.3298 512.45 o.ooof 5.685 
MILSPOUS -0.0164 0.50 0.4812 -0.347 
HITECH -0.0019 0.02 0.8902 -0.039 
AFQT 0.0012 15.57 0.0001* 0.024 
TIER2 0.0450 6.18 
.. 
0.0129 0.922 
TIER3 -0.1651 18.72 
. 
0.0001 -3.793 
TIER4 -0.2717 243.09 
. 
0.0001 -6.592 
TIERS ,..0.2991- 385.02 o.ooof -7.357 
Model Chi-Square= 1426.068 with 12 OF (p = 0.0001); n = 70,116 
a change in probability of staying for a one unit change in the explanatory variable, calculated at 
the mean values. 
b change in probability of staying in the absence of the separation bonus. 
)ignificant at the 99% confidence level 
significant at the 95% confidence level 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
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The coefficient of TIER2 is found to be significant at the 9S% confidence 
level, but, contrary to expectation, has a positive sign. This indicates that 
service members in tier 2 are less inclined to accept the financial separation 
bonus. An explanation for this behavior might be that enlistees in tier 2 
perceived themselves to be relatively safe from involuntary separation, because 
personnel in tier 2 would only be minimally affected while those in tiers 3 to S 
would bear the main burden of a potential RIF. This might have been 
interpreted as being more or less exempt from involuntary separation, which may 
have lowered the probability of accepting the VSIISSB program. 
The- coefficients of TIER3 to TIERS are all significant at the 99% 
confidence level. As hypothesized, their signs are negative and the magnitude 
of the coefficients increase from TIER3 to TIERS, indicating that the higher the 
threat of RIF the higher the probability of accepting the financial separation 
bonus. 
Table 4.9 illustrates the marginal effects of the tier-specific threat of 
involuntary separation on the average individual. The column labeled "No 
Threat of RIF" lists the predicted probability of leaving for the average individual 
in the sample without the threat of involuntary separation. The column ''Threat 
of RIF" shows the tier-specific simulated acceptance probabilities for the 
notional person if he/she were in the respective tier and subject to involuntary 
separation. 
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Table 4.9 Predicted Probabilities of Accepting VSIISSB for the Notional 
Person With and Without the Threat of Involuntary Separation 
No Threat of Threat of Difference in Probabilities With 
RIF RIF and Without the Threat of Rl F 
TIER2 12.862 11.941 -0.921 
TIER3 12.862 16.655 3.793 
TIER4 12.862 19.454 6.592 
TIERS 12.862 20.219 7.357 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
The respective marginal effects indicate that TIERS had the largest influence on 
program acceptance rates. Being in tier 5 is estimated to increase the 
probability -of leaving for the notional person by 7.357 percentage points, a 
relative increase of 57.2 percent. 
The average effects of the threat of involuntary separation on program 
acceptance rates are listed in Table 4.10. The results are very similar to those 
presented in Table 4.9 with TIERS increasing the acceptance rate by 7.233 
percentage points, a relative increase of 56.36 percent. 
Table 4.10 Predicted Probabilities of Accepting VSI/SSB Averaged over 
Sample Group With and Without the Threat of Involuntary 
Separation 
Threat of No Threat of Difference in Probabilities With 
RIF RIF and Without the Threat ofRIF 
TIER2 12.175 13.098 -0.923 
TIER3 17.177 13.335 3.842 
TIER4 19.650 13.068 6.582 
TIERS 20.066 12.833 7.233 
-Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
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However, as previously discussed, the threat of future involuntary separation 
may reduce the individual's perceived ACOL. Thus, the above findings on 
TIER3 to TIERS can be expected to be biased upward while the estimated effect 
of TIER2 on the program acceptance behavior may be biased downward. This 
particular problem is addressed in the following paragraph. 
2. Model II: Calculating the ACOL Value Using Assumed RIF 
Probabilities 
Table 4.11 illustrates the results for the probit regression of the merged 
data set where the ACOL values were conditioned on the tier-specific threat of 
involuntary separation, assuming 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% probability of being 
discharged for tier 2 to tier 5, respectively. As expected, the marginal effects of 
the dummy variables TIER3 to TIERS decrease in magnitude when the ACOL 
variable is adjusted for the tier-specific threat of reductions-in-force. This 
suggests that the previous estimates of the effect of the threat of involuntary 
separation on program acceptance behavior were upward biased. The marginal 
effect of TIER2 is found to be larger in magnitude than that of the model with the 
unadjusted ACOL value, which also follows the above hypothesis that the effect 
of TIER2 was previously downward biased in Model I. 
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Table 4.11 Probit Regression Results of Navy and Air Force Enlisted 
Personnel in FY92 With the Inclusion of the Threat of RIF in the 
ACOL Calculationa 
Variable Coefficient Wald X2 Pr>x2 APi/AXb 
{Marginal Effect} 
INTERCEPT 0.668S 23S.20 0.0001 
ACOL 0.000013 36.08 o.ooof 1.S79c 
MALE 0.2227 100.00 o.ooof S.480 
MARRIED 0.1722 8S.42 o.ooof 4.132 
DEPS -0.0339 43.46 
. 
0.0001 -0.7S7 
MINORITY 0.327S SOS.86 
. 
0.0001 S.936 
MILSPOUS -0.0117 0.2S 0.61S8 -0.2S7 
HITECH -0.0003 0.00 0.9840 -0.006 
AFQT 0.0010 12.02 O.OOOS 
. 
0.022 
TIER2 0.0683 13.12 
. 
0.0003 1.441 
TIER3 -0.132S 11.SS o.ooot -3.11S 
TIER4 -0.224S 128.12 0.0001. -S.S27 
TIERS -0.2362 148.60 
. 
0.0001 -S.849 
Model Chi-Square= 1376.507 with 12 OF (p = 0.0001); n = 70,116 
a this model assumes a tier-specific threat of involuntary separation of 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% 
for tier 2 to tier 5, respectively 
b change in probability of staying for a one unit change in the explanatory variable, calculated at 
the mean values. 
c change in probability of staying in the absence of the separation bonus. 
·significant at the 99% confidence level 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
Whereas in Modell the marginal effect of TIER2 decreased the average 
probability of leaving by 0.922 percentage points, in Model II with the adjusted 
ACOL value this effect rises to a difference of 1.441 percentage points. The 
reestimated effects on the probability of accepting the VSIISSB program of 
variables TIER3 to TIERS all decrease in magnitude, with the most significant 
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reduction for variable TIERS. Incorporating the threat of involuntary separation 
in the calculation of the ACOL variable decreases the marginal effect of TIERS 
from 7.3S7 percentage points to S.849 percentage points. The marginal effects 
of the tier dummy variables on program acceptance rates are displayed in Table 
4.12. It shows that, even though the threat of involuntary separation lowers the 
ACOL value, the threat of being RIF'd still increases the voluntary separation 
rate substantially. The estimated marginal effect of TIERS represents a relative 
increase in the acceptance rate of 42.7 4 percent. 
Table 4.12 Predicted Probabilities of Accepting VSI/SSB for the Notional 
- Person With and Without the Threat of Involuntary Separationa 
No Threat of Threat of Difference in Probabilities With 
RIF RIF and Without the Threat of RIF 
TIER2 13.686 12.24S -1.441 
TIER3 13.686 16.801 3.11S 
TIER4 13.686 19.213 S.S27 
TIERS 13.686 19.S3S S.849 
a 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% threat of involuntary separation included in the calculation of the 
ACOL value 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
Table 4.13 illustrates the predicted probabilities of accepting the program 
averaged over the entire sample. Comparing it with the figures presented in 
Table 4.10 reveals that, as expected, the averaged effects of variables TIER3 to 
TIERS decreased in magnitude while the influence of TIER2 increased. 
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Table 4.13 Predicted Probabilities of Accepting VSI/SSB Averaged over 
Sample With and Without the Threat of Involuntary Separationa 
Threat of No Threat of Difference in Probabilities With 
RIF RIF and Without the Threat of Rl F 
TIER2 12.208 13.631 -1.423 
TIER3 17.210 14.070 3.140 
TIER4 19.699 14.122 5.577 
TIERS 20.126 14.226 5.900 
a 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% threat of involuntary separation included in the calculation of the 
ACOLvalue 
Source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
The findings of Modell and Model II on the effect of the tier-specific threat 
of involuntary separation on the service member's probability of accepting the 
separation bonus illustrate that the threat of potential RIF is a significant 
complement to a VSIISSB program. Whereas individuals in tier 2 (lowest threat) 
are found to be actually less likely to leave voluntarily, those in tiers associated 
with higher threats of RIF are more likely to take the bonus and leave the 
military. If the Navy had threatened to conduct RIF in the event the acceptance 
figures of the VSI/SSB program were found to be insufficient to meet the future 
force strength, the above results indicate that the financial separation bonus 
would have been accepted to a significantly higher degree. In the event the 
Navy had implemented a system similar to the Air Force's five tier system, the 
conservative figures presented in Table 4.13 imply that the threat of involuntary 
separation would have increased the acceptance rate of Navy enlisted 
personnel from 4,320 to 5,963, a relative increase of 38.03 percent. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis conducted an analysis of the effect of the cost of leaving on 
the voluntary separation behavior of Navy officers and Navy enlisted personnel. 
The analysis performed in the thesis was primarily concerned with statistically 
identifying the proportion of those who separated that would have left even in 
the absence of the VSIISSB program and the proportion that was induced to 
leave by the financial bonus. The utility-maximization framework of occupational 
decision making and the Annualized Cost of Leaving Model were used to specify 
retention models. Multivariate probit models were estimated to derive the effect 
of the Special Separation Bonus (SSB) on the decision to accept the VSIISSB 
program. Estimating the model for VSIISSB-eligible Navy officers in FY93 found 
that out of the 848 officers who left, 585 would have done so even in the 
absence of the bonus and 263 were induced to leave by the bonus. Using these 
figures, the economic benefits of the program in the form of savings in future 
military pay and retirement benefits was $189.5 million; the immediate program 
costs were computed to be $48.8 million. 
The multivariate probit model for VSIISSB-eligible Navy enlisted in FY92 
found that only 174 sailors out of 4,320 were induced to leave by the incentive 
program. That is, 4146 would have left even in the absence of the financial 
bonus program. In this case, program costs of $156.5 million exceeded the 
economic benefits of $93.49 million. However, the above estimates for enlisted 
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personnel seem to be implausibly low. There are several reasons why the 
VSIISSB program produced such an implausibly small effect in our estimates. 
For one thing, the discount rate adopted, 1 0 percent, may be too low. A higher 
discount rate would tend to discount the military pay stream by more than the 
civilian income stream, thus reducing the cost of leaving. For another, the 
assumption that enlisted personnel would stay until 20 YOS may not be 
supportable. These issues should be investigated in follow-on research. 
This thesis also estimated the effect of the threat of a reduction-in-force 
(involuntary separation) on bonus acceptance decisions for Navy and Air Force 
enlisted personnel in FY92. As hypothesized, the threat of a future involuntary 
separation significantly increases the probability of accepting the financial 
bonus. However, the potential costs associated with a RIF would be immense. 
Such a policy could be interpreted as "opportunistic" behavior on the part of DoD 
and, thus, ·future retention and recruitment problems might be created by 
implementing involuntary separation policies. Additionally, morale and 
motivation of those remaining in the military might be severely reduced. Thus, 
although the threat of involuntary separation was found to be an effective 
complement to a VSI/SSB program, the impact of a major RIF on politics, 
society, and the military may be more detrimental than the potential cost savings 
associated with such a policy. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis provided an analysis of the VSIISSB acceptance behavior of 
Navy officers and Navy enlisted personnel in the first year the program was 
offered to each group. To the extent that eligible personnel may have been 
surprised by the sudden introduction of the VSIISSB program and, thus, may 
have been unable to analyze their military and civilian career opportunities 
rationally, the effect of a future separation bonus on voluntary separation may 
substantially differ from the one estimated in this thesis. A study using data on 
the entire time period during which the VSI/SSB program was offered could shed 
more light -on the effect of the program on the respective groups of eligibles. 
Data from subsequent years on the voluntary separation behavior of bonus 
eligibles should be pooled to determine whether the VSI/SSB program was an 
efficient and effective tool to shape the force to meet future end strength goals. 
Future manpower planners could use these results to better determine the 
amount of a financial voluntary separation bonus that should be offered, once 
the end strength goal is known. Additionally, the resulting estimates could 
provide a more accurate basis for calculating the total cost and the total 
economic benefit of the separation bonus program. 
One area that needs attention is a comparison of program acceptance 
behavior between the military Services. If the decision to accept a separation 
bonus differs inherently between Services, a voluntary separation program that 
induces sufficient personnel of one Service to leave, may be found to be too 
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attractive or too unattractive in another Service. Future voluntary separation 
programs should differ between Services according to their respective 
drawdown requirements and the Service-specific predictions of the acceptance 
behavior of a voluntary separation program. 
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APPENDIX A. ESTIMATES OF THE EXPECTED MILITARY PAY 
Appendix A presents the values of the expected military pay by YOS. To 
estimate the service members' probability of being in a certain paygrade given 
YOS, the Navy's officer and enlisted master files for FY93 and FY92, 
respectively, and the Air Force's enlisted master file for FY92 were obtained 
from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Table A.1 illustrates the 
probability of being in a specific paygrade by YOS for female Navy officers in 
FY93. These probabilities were then combined with Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service (DFAS) military pay data of FY92 and FY93 to obtain the 
expected value of military pay by YOS. Military retirement benefits were 
estimated as 50 percent of the military base pay at YOS 20. Tables A.2 and A.3 
display the values of the expected annual military pay by year of service for 
female and male officers in FY93. Tables A.4 and A.5 show the respective 
estimates for Navy enlisted in FY92. Finally, Tables A.6 and A.7 list the 
expected annual military pay by YOS for female and male Air Force enlisted 
personnel in FY92. 
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Table A.1 Probability of Being in a Specific Paygrade by YOS for Female 
Navy Officers in FY93 
YOS 01 02 03 04 05 06 
7 2.85 6.00 83.41 7.31 0.42 0.00 
8 2.79 4.37 84.85 7.41 0.57 0.00 
9 2.64 3.68 80.61 11.88 1.11 0.07 
10 3.79 3.18 78.92 12.74 1.14 0.23 
11 2.92 4.59 65.72 25.27 1.08 0.42 
12 2.29 3.67 47.94 42.9 3.12 0.09 
13 3.02 4.03 20.31 64.41 7.78 0.46 
14 2.80 2.48 11.66 . 75.24 6.87 0.96 
15 1.84 1.84 11.50 75.54 8.05 1.23 
16 1.71 2.22 11.78 66.78 14.69 2.82 
17 0.39 1.38 14.26 49.85 32.15 1.97 
18 0.39 1.18 15.29 36.99 42.09 4.05 
19 0.30 1.79 14.95 34.08 45.59 3.29 
20 0.14 0.68 10.27 33.38 52.84 2.70 
source: derived from data obtained from DMDC 
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TableA.2 Expected Military Pay by YOS for Female Navy Officers in FY93 
YOS Ex~. Mii.Pa~, Single Ex~. Mil. Pa~, Married 
7 37,296 38,424 
8 37,992 39,072 
9 38,148 39,228 
10 40,056 41,136 
11 40,488 41,556 
12 43,032 44,124 
13 43,956 45,072 
14 46,176 47,280 
15 46,464 47,556 
16 48,528 49,692 
17 49,404 50,640 
18 51,636 52,944 
19 51,708 53,028 
Retirement Pay 25,008 25,008 
source: calculations by author, derived from data obtained from DMDC and 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
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Retirement Pay 24,918 24,918 
source: calculations by author, derived from data obtained from DMDC and 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
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Table A.4 Expected Military Pay by YOS for Female Navy Enlisted 
Personnel in FY92 
YOS Exp. Mii.Pay, Single Exp. Mil. Pay, Married 
10 19,050 20,372 
11 19,385 20,834 
12 20,306 21,795 
13 20,590 22,108 
14 21,562 23,127 
15 22,151 23,760 
16 23,110 24,743 
17 23,584 25,232 
18 24,498 26,150 
19 24,672 26,318 
-
Retirement Pay 12,404 12,404 
source: calculations by author, derived from data obtained from DMDC and 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
Table A.5 Expected Military Pay by YOS for Male Navy Enlisted 
Personnel in FY92 
YOS Exp. Mii.Pay, Single Exp. Mil. Pay, Married 
10 20,049 21,554 
11 20,460 22,034 
12 21,578 23,186 
13 21,648 23,473 
14 22,801 24,443 
15 23,146 24,800 
16 24,021 25,675 
17 24,614 26,265 
18 25,242 26,887 
19 25,572 27,210 
Retirement Pay 12,462 12,462 
source: calculations by author, derived from data obtained from DMDC and 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
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Table A.6 Expected Military Pay by YOS for Female Air Force 
Enlisted Personnel in FY92 
YOS Exp. Mii.Pay, Single Exp. Mil. Pay, Married 
10 19,050 20,372 
11 19,385 20,834 
12 20,306 21,795 
13 20,590 22,108 
14 21,562 23,127 
15 22,151 23,760 
16 23,110 24,743 
17 23,584 25,232 
18 24,498 26,150 
19 24,672 26,318 
Retirement Pay 12,056 12,056 
source: calculations by author, derived from data obtained from DMDC and 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DF AS) 
Table A.7 Expected Military Pay by YOS for Male Air Force Enlisted 
Personnel in FY92 
YOS Exp. Mii.Pay, Single Exp. Mil. Pay, Married 
10 20,049 21,554 
11 20,460 22,034 
12 21,578 23,186 
13 21,848 23,473 
14 22,801 24,443 
15 23,146 24,800 
16 24,021 25,675 
17 24,614 26,265 
18 25,242 26,887 
19 25,572 27,210 
Retirement Pay 12,1 02 12,1 02 
source: calculations by author, derived from data obtained from DMDC and 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
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APPENDIX B. CIVILIAN AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES FOR OFFICERS 
Appendix B displays the estimated civilian age-earnings profile used in 
calculating the returns from leaving the military immediately and the expected 
future earnings after retirement. The age-earnings profiles were estimated using 
the Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) from the 1990 Decennial Census. 
PUMS are prepared by the Bureau of the Census and contain records 
representing five percent or one percent of the housing units in the U.S. and the 
persons in them ... Restricting the data set to only veterans reduced the number 
of observations from the original 866,383 to 51 ,212. We assumed officers to 
have a coltege degree or higher. Equation (8.1) below displays the estimated 
civilian age-earnings profile for veterans who are officers: 
Ln(EARNS) = 7.70+0.1 *AGE -0.0009* AGE2 +0.14* MARRIED 
- 0.22 * MLRET + 0.27 *MALE 
(8.1) 
where Ln(EARNS) is the natural logarithm of the individual's civilian income, 
AGE is a continuous variable for the individual's age, MALE and MARRIED are 
dummy variables controlling for gender and marital status, and MILRET is a 
dummy variable coded = 1 if the veteran had 20 or more YOS, coded = 0 if 
otherwise. Consistent with the findings of Warner and Goldberg (1986), male 
and married veterans are found to have higher civilian income, while those who 
stay longer in the military (MILRET = 1) earn less than comparable veterans who 
leave with less than 20 YOS. Since the civilian income data in PUMS are based 
on the year prior to the census, the official Consumer Price Indices (CPI) for 
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1989 and 1993 were used to inflate the individual's predicted annual income to 
19931evel. 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate the expected civilian earnings for female and 
male officers who left the military wit.h less than 20 YOS. Tables 8.3 and 8.4 
show the respective civilian income figures for officers after retirement. 
Table 8.1 Estimated Annual Civilian Earnings by Age for Female Officers 
who Leave the Military before YOS 20, Base Year 1993 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
25 17,560 20,117 
26 18,515 21,212 
27 19,487 22,325 
28 20,472 23,453 
29 21,467 24,594 
30 22,470 25,742 
31 23,476 26,894 
32 24,482 28,047 
33 25,484 29,195 
34 26,478 30,334 
35 27,461 31,460 
36 28,428 32,568 
37 29,375 33,653 
38 30,298 34,710 
39 31 '192 35,735 
40 32,054 36,722 
41 32,880 37,668 
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Table 8.1 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
42 33,664 38,566 
43 34,404 39,414 
44 35,095 40,206 
45 35,735 40,939 
46 36,320 41,609 
47 36,846 42,212 
48 37,312 42,745 
49 37,713 43,206 
50 38,050 43,591 
51 38,318 43,899 
52 38,518 44,127 
53 38,648 44,276 
54 38,707 44,343 
55 38,695 44,329 
56 38,611 44,234 
57 38,457 44,058 
58 38,234 43,802 
59 37,942 43,467 
60 37,583 43,056 
61 37,159 42,571 
62 36,673 42,013 
63 36,126 41,387 
64 35,522 40,695 
65 34,864 39,941 
66 34,156 39,130 
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Table 8.1 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel($) Personnel ($) 
67 33,400 38,264 
68 32,601 37,349 
69 31,763 36,388 
70 30,889 35,388 
71 29,985 34,351 
72 29,053 33,284 
73 28,099 32,191 
74 27,126 31,076 
75 26,139 29,945 
76 25,141 28,802 
77 24,137 27,652 
78 23,131 26,499 
source: derived from Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) 1990 
Table 8.2 Estimated Annual Civilian Earnings by Age for Male Officers who 
Leave the Military before YOS 20, Base Year 1993 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel {$} Personnel {$} 
25 22,952 26,295 
26 24,201 27,725 
27 25,471 29,180 
28 26,759 30,655 
29 28,060 32,146 
30 29,370 33,647 
31 30,685 35,153 
32 32,000 36,660 
33 33,309 38,160 
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Table 8.2 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
34 34,609 39,649 
35 35,894 41 '121 
36 37,158 42,569 
37 38,396 43,987 
38 39,602 45,369 
39 40,771 46,708 
40 41,897 47,999 
41 42,976 49,234 
42 44,001 50,409 
43 44,968 51,517 
44 45,872 52,553 
45 46,709 53,511 
46 47,473 54,386 
47 48,161 55,174 
48 48,769 55,871 
49 49,294 56,473 
50 49,734 56,976 
51 50,085 57,379 
52 50,346 57,678 
53 50,516 57,872 
54 50,593 57,960 
55 50,577 57,942 
56 50,468 57,817 
57 50,267 57,587 
58 49,975 57,252 
59 49,593 56,815 
60 49,124 5§,278 
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Table 8.2 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
61 48,570 55,643 
62 47,934 54,914 
63 47,219 54,096 
64 46,430 53,191 
65 45,570 52,206 
66 44,644 51,145 
67 43,656 50,014 
68 42,612 48,817 
69 41,516 47,562 
70 40,375 46,254 
71 39,192 44,900 
72 37,975 43,505 
73 36,727 42,076 
source: derived from Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) 1990 
Table 8.3 Estimated Annual Civilian Earnings by Age for Female Officers 
after Retiring from the Military, Base Year 1993 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
25 14,131 16,189 
26 14,900 17,070 
27 15,682 17,965 
28 16,474 18,873 
29 17,275 19,791 
30 18,082 20,715 
31 18,891 21,643 
32 19,701 22,570 
33 20,507 23,494 
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Table 8.3 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
34 21,308 24,411 
35 22,099 25,317 
36 22,877 26,208 
37 23,639 27,081 
38 24,382 27,932 
39 25,101 28,757 
40 25,795 29,551 
41 26,459 30,312 
42 27,090 31,035 
43 27,686 31,717 
44 28,242 32,355 
45 28,757 32,945 
46 29,227 33,484 
47 29,651 33,969 
48 30,025 34,398 
49 30,349 34,768 
50 30,619 35,078 
51 30,836 35,326 
52 30,996 35,510 
53 31,101 35,630 
54 31,148 35,684 
55 31,138 35,673 
56 31,071 35,596 
57 30,948 35,454 
58 30,768 35,248 
59 30,533 34,979 
60 30,244 34,648 
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Table 8.3 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
61 29,903 34,257 
62 29,511 33,809 
63 29,071 33,305 
64 28,585 32,748 
65 28,056 32,142 
66 27,486 31,488 
67 26,878 30,792 
68 26,235 30,055 
69 25,560 29,282 
70 24,857 28,477 
71 24,129 27,643 
72 23,380 26,784 
73 22,612 25,905 
74 21,829 25,008 
75 21,034 24,098 
76 20,232 23,178 
77 19,424 22,252 
78 18,614 21,325 
source: derived from Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) 1990 
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Table 8.4 Estimated Annual Civilian Earnings by Age for Male Officers 
after Retiring from the Military, Base Year 1993 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
36 29,902 34,257 
37 30,898 35,398 
38 31,868 36,510 
39 32,809 37,588 
40 33,716 38,626 
41 34,584 39,621 
42 35,409 40,566 
43 36,187 41,458 
44 36,915 42,291 
45 37,587 43,062 
46 38,202 43,766 
47 38,756 44,401 
48 39,245 44,962 
49 39,668 45,446 
50 40,022 45,851 
51 40,304 46,175 
52 40,515 46,415 
53 40,651 46,572 
54 40,713 . 46,643 
55 40,700 46,628 
56 40,613 46,528 
57 40,451 46,342 
58 40,216 46,073 
59 39,909 45,721 
60 39,531 45,289 
61 39,085 44,778 
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Table 8.4 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
62 38,573 44,191 
63 37,998 43,533 
64 37,363 42,805 
65 36,671 42,012 
66 35,926 41,158 
67 35,131 40,248 
68 34,291 39,285 
69 33,409 38,275 
70 32,490 37,223 
71 31,539 36,132 
72 30,559 35,010 
73 29,555 33,860 
source: derived from Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) 1990 
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APPENDIX C. CIVILIAN AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES FOR ENLISTED 
PERSONNEL 
Appendix C presents the estimates of the annual civilian earning 
opportunities for Navy and Air Force enlisted personnel. The age-earnings 
profile for veterans with high school degrees, as estimated using the 1990 
PUMS data, is displayed in Equation (C.1) below. 
Ln(EARNS) = 7.94 + 0.08 *AGE- 0.0008 * AGE2 + 0.14 *MARRIED 
- 0.15 * A1/LRET + 0.27 *MALE 
(C.1) 
Using the CPI, the individual's predicted annual civilian income by age was then 
inflated to 1992. 
Tables C.1 and C.2 display the expected civilian earnings for female and 
male enlisted who left the military with less than 20 YOS. Tables C.3 and C.4 
show the respective civilian income figures for enlisted after retirement. 
Table C.1 Estimated Annual Civilian Earnings by Age for Female Enlisted 
who Leave the Military before YOS 20, Base Year 1992 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
25 14,326 16,413 
26 14,913 17,085 
.. 
27 15,500 17,757 
28 16,085 18,428 
29 16,666 19,094 
30 17,242 19,753 
31 17,810 20,404 
32 18,369 21,043 
33 18,915 21,670 
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Table C.1 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
34 19,448 22,280 
35 19,965 22,872 
36 20,464 23,444 
37 20,943 23,992 
38 21,400 24,516 
39 21,833 25,012 
40 22,241 25,479 
41 22,621 25,915 
42 22,972 26,317 
43 23,293 26,685 
44 23,581 27,015 
45 23,837 27,308 
46 24,057 27,561 
47 24,243 27,773 
48 24,392 27,944 
49 24,504 28,073 
50 24,579 28,158 
51 24,615 28,200 
52 24,614 28,199 
53 24,575 . 28,153 
54 24,498 28,065 
55 24,383 27,934 
56 24,231 27,760 
57 24,043 27,545 
58 23,820 27,289 
59 23,563 26,994 
60 23,272 26,661 
92 
Table C.1 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
61 22,949 26,291 
62 22,596 25,886 
63 22,213 25,448 
64 21,804 24,979 
65 21,369 24,481 
66 20,910 23,956 
67 20,430 23,405 
68 19,930 22,832 
69 19,412 22,239 
70 18,878 21,627 
71 18,331 21,000 
72 17,772 20,360 
73 17,203 19,708 
74 16,627 19,048 
75 16,045 18,382 
76 15,460 17,711 
77 14,873 17,039 
78 14,286 16,367 
source: derived from Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) 1990 
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Table C.2 Estimated Annual Civilian Earnings by Age for Male Enlisted 
who Leave the Military before YOS 20, Base Year 1992 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
25 18,726 21,453 
26 19,493 22,331 
27 20,260 23,210 
28 21,024 24,086 
29 21,784 24,957 
30 22,537 25,819 
31 23,279 26,669 
32 24,009 27,505 
33 24,723 28,324 
34 25,420 29,122 
35 26,095 29,895 
36 26,747 30,643 
37 27,373 31,360 
38 27,971 32,044 
39 28,537 32,693 
40 29,070 33,303 
41 29,567 33,873 
42 30,026 34,399 
43 30,445 34,879 
44 30,823 35,311 
45 31,156 35,693 
46 31,445 36,024 
47 31,687 36,302 
48 31,882 36,525 
49 32,029 36,693 
50 32,126 36,805 
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Table C.2 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
51 32,174 36,860 
52 32,172 36,858 
53 32,121 36,799 
54 32,020 36,683 
55 31,870 36,511 
56 31,672 36,284 
57 31,427 36,003 
58 31,135 35,669 
59 30,798 35,283 
60 30,418 34,848 
61 29,996 34,364 
62 29,534 33,835 
63 29,035 33,263 
64 28,499 32,650 
65 27,931 31,998 
66 27,331 31,312 
67 26,704 30,592 
68 26,050 29,843 
69 25,373 29,068 
70 24,975 28,268 
71 23,959 27,449 
72 23,229 26,611 
73 22,486 25,760 
source: derived from Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) 1990 
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Table C.3 Estimated Annual Civilian Earnings by Age for Female Enlisted 
after Retiring from the Military, Base Year 1992 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
25 12,303 14,095 
26 12,807 14,672 
27 13,311 15,250 
28 13,814 15,825 
29 14,313 16,397 
30 14,807 16,964 
31 15,295 17,523 
32 15,775 18,072 
33 16,244 18,610 
34 16,702 19,134 
35 17,146 19,642 
36 17,574 20,133 
37 17,985 20,605 
38 18,378 21,054 
39 18,750 21,481 
40 19,100 21,882 
41 19,427 22,256 
42 19,728 22,601 
43 20,004 22,917 
44 20,252 23,201 
45 20,471 23,452 
46 20,660 23,669 
47 20,820 23,852 
48 20,948 23,998 
49 21,044 24,109 
50 21,108 24,182 
51 21 '140 24,218 
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Table C.3 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
52 21,138 24,217 
53 21,105 24,178 
54 21,038 24,102 
55 20,940 23,989 
56 20,810 23,840 
57 20,648 23,655 
58 20,457 23,436 
59 20,235 23,182 
60 19,986 22,896 
61 19,708 22,579 
62 19,405 22,231 
63 19,077 21,855 
64 18,725 21,452 
65 18,352 21,024 
66 17,958 20,573 
67 17,545 20,100 
68 17,116 19,608 
69 16,671 19,098 
70 16,212 18,573 
71 15,742 18,035 
72 15,262 17,485 
73 14,774 16,925 
74 14,279 16,358 
75 13,779 15,786 
76 13,277 15,210 
77 12,773 14,633 
78 12,269 14,056 
source: derived from Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) 1990 
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Table C.4 Estimated Annual Civilian Earnings by Age for Male Enlisted 
after Retiring from the Military, Base Year 1992 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel ($) Personnel ($) 
25 16,082 18,423 
26 16,740 19,178 
27 17,399 19,933 
28 18,056 20,685 
29 18,708 21,433 
30 19,355 22,173 
31 19,992 22,904 
32 20,619 23,621 
33 21,232 24,324 
34 21,830 25,009 
35 22,411 25,674 
36 22,971 26,316 
37 23,508 26,932 
38 24,021 27,519 
39 24,508 28,077 
40 24,965 28,601 
41 25,392 29,090 
42 25,786 29,542 
43 26,146 . 29,954 
44 26,470 30,325 
45 26,757 30,653 
46 27,005 30,937 
47 27,213 31,176 
48 27,380 31,368 
49 27,506 31,512 
50 27,590 31,608 
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Table C.4 Continued 
Age Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Personnel {$} Personnel {$} 
51 27,631 31,655 
52 27,630 31,653 
53 27,585 31,603 
54 27,499 31,503 
55 27,370 31,356 
56 27,200 31 '161 
57 26,989 30,919 
58 26,738 30,632 
59 26,449 30,301 
60 26,123 29,927 
61 25,760 29,512 
62 25,364 29,058 
63 24,935 28,566 
64 24,475 28,039 
65 23,987 27,480 
66 23,472 26,890 
67 22,933 26,272 
68 22,371 25,629 
69 21,790 24,963 
70 21,191 24,277 
71 20,576 23,573 
72 19,949 22,854 { 
73 19,310 22,123 
source: derived from Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) 1990 
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